Author: Caroline E. Oks

CIPA Litigation and the “Technological Capability” to Violate California’s Privacy Laws

In Ambriz v. Google, LLC,  a court in the Northern District of California refused to grant Google’s motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims under Section 631(a) of the California Invasion of Privacy Act (CIPA) for (i) “intentional wiretapping,” and (ii) “willfully attempting to learn the contents or meaning of a communication in transit.”  The lawsuit challenges Google’s AI-powered product, Google Cloud Contact Center AI (“GCCCAI”), which is used to support the customer service centers of other businesses by providing a virtual agent with whom callers can interact. The plaintiffs alleged that they placed customer service calls to businesses that use the GCCCAI service – specifically, Verizon, Hulu, GoDaddy, and Home Depot – and spoke with a “virtual agent” and human representative but did not know that Google would be listening in on and transcribing the call. Nor did the plaintiffs consent to Google’s alleged eavesdropping. Google moved to dismiss the CIPA claims on the ground, among others, that it simply provides a software tool to its business clients and was not “an unauthorized third-party listener to the communications between the named Plaintiffs and the customer service centers they called.” In denying Google’s motion to dismiss, the court began its analysis by explaining the split that has emerged in cases interpreting CIPA 631(a): Some courts require...

Fourth Circuit Rockets Certified Class Due to Lack of Article III Standing

In a 2-1 recent published decision, the Fourth Circuit decertified a class, holding that every class member must be concretely harmed by an alleged statutory violation under the Supreme Court’s seminal holding on Article III standing in TransUnion v. Ramirez. Alig v. Rocket Mortgage, LLC involved statutory and common law claims under West Virginia law by a proposed class of consumers against Quicken Loans, Inc. (now Rocket Mortgage, LLC), alleging that, in refinancing their home-mortgage loans, the consumers paid for “independent appraisals” that were not “independent” at all. In fact, the defendants provided to the appraisers the homeowners’ own estimates of their homes’ values, which they had provided in their loan application. The plaintiffs claimed that the inclusion of the borrowers’ own estimates inflated the appraisals and so compromised the integrity of the appraisal process as to render their appraisals unreliable and worthless. The District Court certified a class of “‘[a]ll West Virginia citizens who refinanced mortgage loans with Quicken, and for whom Quicken obtained appraisals through an appraisal request form that included an estimate of value of the subject property,’” which amounted to 2,769 loans. The court then granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs and class members and awarded them more than $10.6 million in statutory damages, among other relief. On the first appeal, the...

ChatBot or Not: California Federal Courts Limit CIPA Applicability

The Northern District of California recently issued a decision further constraining plaintiffs’ ability to assert claims under the California Invasion of Privacy Act (CIPA). In Ambriz v. Google, LLC, the plaintiff filed a putative class action alleging that Google violated CIPA § 631(a) because its Cloud Contact Center AI software-as-a-service, a virtual customer service tool, wiretapped, eavesdropped on, and recorded his call to Verizon’s customer service center.

New Jersey Supreme Court Confirms the Enforceability of Class Action Waivers

The New Jersey Supreme Court issued a unanimous opinion on July 10, 2024, holding that class action waivers in consumer contracts are not per se contrary to public policy. While such waivers may be unenforceable if they are unconscionable or violate other tenets of state contract law, the opinion confirms that there is no blanket prohibition on them – a positive development for businesses in New Jersey. Pace v. Hamilton Cove concerned a putative class action filed by residential tenants of Hamilton Cove Apartments, a luxury apartment complex in a high crime area. In its advertisements, brochures, and oral statements to prospective tenants during tours, Hamilton Cove Apartments promised that the complex would have “elevated, 24/7 security,” with security personnel stationed round-the-clock near each building’s entrance. The plaintiffs alleged that the promises were knowingly false when made, and that they relied on those representations in deciding to sign the lease. The lease contained a “Class Action Waiver” Addendum, by which the lessee “expressly waive[d] any right and/or ability to bring, represent, join, or otherwise maintain a Class Action.” The defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiffs’ Consumer Fraud Act (CFA) claim, arguing in pertinent part that a class action was not necessary to vindicate the plaintiffs’ interests and, in any event, that the leases contained class...

New Jersey Supreme Court Holds “Illusory Discounts” Do Not Support a Claim of Ascertainable Loss Under the Consumer Fraud Act

In a 4-3 opinion, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the mere purchase of a product falsely represented as “discounted” does not, without more, satisfy the “ascertainable loss” element under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (NJCFA). In Robey v. SPARC Group LLC, the plaintiffs – a proposed class of shoppers at the retail clothing store Aéropostale – alleged that the store advertised clothing as being discounted when, in fact, the items had never been offered or sold at the higher prices off of which the “discount” was taken. The plaintiffs contend that this practice of so-called “illusory discounts” violated the NJCFA, the Truth in Consumer-Contract, Warranty and Notice Act (TCCWNA), and various common law contract rights. The trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, determining that the plaintiffs failed to allege an “ascertainable loss.” The Appellate Division majority disagreed and reversed, noting some confusion as to whether the NJCFA’s “ascertainable loss” requirement was the same as the TCCWNA’s “aggrieved consumer” requirement. The Supreme Court granted certification and reversed, finding that the plaintiffs’ NJCFA claim failed because they could show neither of the two recognized types of “ascertainable loss” for a claim based on a seller’s alleged deception: an out-of-pocket loss or a loss of the benefit-of-the-bargain. First, the plaintiffs...

Appellate Division Holds Plaintiffs Can State a Claim Under New Jersey’s CFA and TCCWNA Statutes Where an Advertised Discount Is Alleged to Be Illusory

A recent split decision from the New Jersey Appellate Division called into question whether the “ascertainable loss” requirement for pleading a claim under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (NJCFA) is the same as the “aggrieved consumers” requirement under the Truth in Consumer Contract, Warranty and Notice Act (TCCWNA). Without deciding that question, the court found that the pleading sufficiently alleged both in asserting that the defendant inflated its prices to offer an illusory discount. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant, SPARC Group LLC, falsely advertised clothing at two of its Aeropostale stores as being discounted from a higher price when the clothing allegedly had never been sold in those stores at the higher price. The plaintiffs asserted that this “markup to markdown” practice violates both the NJCFA, the TCCWNA, and the common law. The trial judge dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim and largely rested her decision on a determination that the plaintiffs failed to allege an “ascertainable loss.” The Appellate Division majority disagreed and reversed. The majority noted some confusion as to whether the NJCFA’s “ascertainable loss” requirement was the same as the TCCWNA’s “aggrieved consumer” requirement. The New Jersey Supreme Court has held that an “ascertainable loss” must be “quantifiable and measurable” and not “hypothetical or illusory,” while the...

Second Circuit Holds Monetary Compensation for Survey Participation Not an “Unsolicited Advertisement” Under the TCPA; Disagrees with Third Circuit

The Second Circuit recently held, in Bruce Katz, M.D., P.C. v. Focus Forward, LLC, that an unsolicited faxed invitation offering $150 to participate in a market research survey does not constitute an “unsolicited advertisement” under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (the “TCPA”). The TCPA defines “unsolicited advertisement” as “any material advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services which is transmitted to any person without that person’s prior express invitation or permission.” The Second Circuit reasoned that the subject fax transmissions “plainly do not advertise the availability of any property, goods, or services” and therefore “cannot reasonably be construed” as unlawful advertisements. The panel did note, however, that its holding may not necessarily extend to all “communications, including faxed surveys, offering the recipient both money and services,” as some such communications could incur liability under the TCPA depending on the specific content of the communication. The Second Circuit’s holding in Katz departed from the reasoning in the Third Circuit’s divided opinion in Fischbein v. Olson Research Group, Inc. The faxes at issue in Fischbein consisted of requests to doctors to participate in market research surveys in exchange for monetary compensation. The Third Circuit held that such faxes are advertisements, reasoning that “an offer of payment in exchange for participation...

Eleventh Circuit Holds That Administrative Feasibility is Not a Precondition for Class Certification

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently analyzed a “hotly contested issue in class action practice” – whether administrative feasibility is a requirement for class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. Breaking from the First, Third, and Fourth Circuits and agreeing with the Second, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits, the Eleventh Circuit held putative class representatives need not prove the existence of an administratively feasible method to identify absent class members as a precondition for certification of a class action.

Following Duguid, South Carolina District Court Limits Reach of TCPA’s Autodialer Definition

In April 2021, the U.S. Supreme Court resolved a circuit split interpreting the Telephone Consumer Protection Act’s (TCPA) definition of “automatic telephone dialing system” or (ATDS). In Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid, the Court held that the clause “using a random or sequential number generator” in the statutory definition of ATDS, 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1), modifies both “store” and “produce,” thereby “specifying how the equipment must either ‘store’ or ‘produce’ telephone numbers.” Accordingly, “a necessary feature of an autodialer under § 227(a)(1)(A) is the capacity to use a random or sequential number generator to either store or produce phone numbers to be called.” Duguid thus reversed the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation that the clause “using a random or sequential number generator” modifies only “produce,” such that a device could be an autodialer if it has the capacity to store and automatically dial numbers, even if the numbers are not generated by a random or sequential number generator. Under Duguid, equipment that makes calls to “targeted…numbers linked to specific accounts” are excluded from liability under the TCPA. In June, the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina had the opportunity to apply the Supreme Court’s decision. In Timms v. USAA Federal Savings Bank, the plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendant for alleged violations of the Fair...

Consumer Fraud Class Action Dismissed With Prejudice: Law Enforcement Tows Are Not Covered by the New Jersey Predatory Towing Prevention Act

On June 14, 2021, Judge Thomas J. Walsh of the Superior Court of New Jersey put an end to the long-running putative class action lawsuit in Kiley v. Tumino’s Towing, which sought to exploit regulations promulgated under the Predatory Towing Prevention Act (PTPA) by the Director of the Division of Consumer Affairs (DCA). The action was removed to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act, where the magistrate judge initially denied a motion to remand and permitted jurisdictional discovery, but the district court judge later remanded back to state court. Finally addressing the merits, the Superior Court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint, with prejudice, agreeing with Tumino’s Towing that the PTPA was not applicable to the towing services requested by law enforcement and performed in accordance with a duly-authorized municipal ordinance. As such, the plaintiff’s sole remaining cause of action for alleged violation of the Consumer Fraud Act (CFA) could not stand. In Kiley, the complaint alleged that the plaintiff’s vehicle was towed by Tumino’s Towing, at the request of the Ridgefield Park Police Department, because his vehicle was illegally parked during a snow emergency. After paying his parking ticket at police headquarters, the plaintiff was given a vehicle release authorization, which he brought to Tumino’s Towing to obtain the release...