We recently reported on the Federal Circuit’s holdings in Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. v. Mylan Pharm. Inc. and AstraZeneca AB v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., where it held that Mylan was subject to jurisdiction in Delaware because “Mylan’s ANDA filings constitute formal acts that reliably indicate plans to engage in marketing of the proposed generic drugs.” Earlier this month, the first decision from the District of New Jersey District applying the Federal Circuits ruling was rendered. In Helsinn Healthcare S.A., et al. v. Hospira, Inc., No. 15-2077 (MLC), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45826 (D.N.J. April 5, 2016), Judge Mary L. Cooper held that sufficient minimum contacts is to find specific jurisdiction is established by the fact that Hospira filed an ANDA seeking to market a generic version of Helsinn’s Aloxi® product that if approved, the marketing of will take place in New Jersey.
Tagged: Civil Procedure
Last week the Federal Circuit handed down one of its more anticipated decisions regarding jurisdiction in cases brought under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) (aka Hatch-Waxman or ANDA litigation). In its holding, the Federal Circuit stated that a “[defendant’s] ANDA filings and its distribution channels” are enough to “establish that [the defendant’s] plans to market its proposed [ANDA product in the forum state]” are enough to meet the minimum-contacts requirement to establish jurisdiction. It further held “there is no substantial argument that considerations of unfairness override the minimum-contacts basis for [the forum state’s] exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over” the defendants. This holding is much broader than the underlying district court rulings and limited the analysis to specific jurisdiction without addressing the underlying general jurisdictional questions.
In State of Vermont v MPHJ Technology Investments, what appears initially as a factual simple matter, presents a complex procedural lesson in the timeliness and basis for removal of a matter from state court to federal court. In 2012, a number of Vermont businesses began receiving correspondence from MPHJ shell corporations alleging patent infringement. As a pattern, a business would receive an initial letter from the MPHJ corporation saying that the business had been identified as using patented technology. The letter included a survey to determine infringement and offered a licensing arrangement. If there was no response from Letter No. 1, Letter Nos. 2 and 3 would follow from MPHJ’s counsel, stating that the lack of a response was an admission and implying that litigation would follow.
On March 16, 2013, with the enactment of certain provisions of the America Invents Act (AIA), the United States’ patent system moved from being a first to invent patent system (first-to-invent) to a first inventor to file patent system (first-to-file) and retired the use of interference proceedings to determine priority of invention. Prior to and after the initiation of first-to-file system, there has been much debate as to the virtues of both systems. One aspect of this debate was that inventors with less resources and universities benefited more from the first-to-invent patent system rather than the first-to-file where resources can impact the ability to file quickly. It was in this atmosphere and as forecasted, that there was a surge in pre-March 16 application by inventors who sought to have their application reviewed under the first-to-invent system.
Supreme Court’s Adoption of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures Will Require Heightened Pleading Standards in Patent Infringement Actions
Recently, the Supreme Court adopted proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that barring any modification by congressional action, may eliminate the difference in pleading standards between patent infringement actions and all other federal actions. However, such standardization of pleading requirements may be short lived in view of the reintroduction of the Innovation Act, H.R. 9, in the House of Representatives, which proposes heightened pleading standard for patent infringement actions.
In a case of procedural jockeying, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in State of Vermont v. MPHJ Technology Investments, LLC, held that a “district court’s remand order dominate[d] any proceedings on th[e] appeal” and because a remand under 28 U.S.C. 1447(d) “is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise[,]” the Federal Circuit lacked appellate jurisdiction.