Gibbons Law Alert

Gibbons Law Alert

Tagged: Class Actions

District of New Jersey Analyzes Article III Standing Requirement in the Class Action Context Under the Supreme Court’s Decision in TransUnion

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Posted in Class Action Defense

On November 10, 2022

In a post-TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190 (2021) victory for the class action defense bar, the District of New Jersey has further clarified the standing requirement for showing concrete harm. In Schultz v. Midland Credit Management., Inc., the Honorable Madeline Cox Arleo, U.S.D.J. granted defendant Midland Credit Management, Inc.’s (“Midland”) motion for summary judgment because the plaintiffs failed to establish concrete harm and thus lacked standing. In Schultz, the plaintiffs filed a putative class action against Midland alleging that the collection agency issued collection letters with false Internal Revenue Service (IRS) reporting language in violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). Midland sent letters to the plaintiffs stating: “We will report forgiveness of debt as required by IRS regulations. Reporting is not required every time a debt is canceled or settled, and might not be required in your case.” Pursuant to the Department of Treasury and IRS regulations, Midland only needed to report discharges of indebtedness greater than $600. As the plaintiffs’ debts were below the $600 threshold, the plaintiffs argued that the IRS reporting language was false, deceptive, and misleading in violation of the FDCPA because the language implied that “there could be ‘negative consequences with the [IRS]’ and ‘deliberately fail[ed] to disclose that such reporting is required under...

New Jersey Appellate Division Finds No Ascertainable Loss Where a Plaintiff Never Used a Product and Made Hypothetical Allegations of Loss

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Posted in Class Action Defense

On July 18, 2022

On May 31, 2022, the Appellate Division in Hoffman v. Pure Radiance, Inc. affirmed the trial court’s order granting summary judgment for a defendant and dismissing the plaintiff’s Consumer Fraud Act (CFA) claims because the plaintiff could not show that he suffered an ascertainable loss where he never used the product and his allegations were not supported by facts. In this putative class action, serial plaintiff Harold Hoffman sued defendant Pure Radiance, Inc., alleging that it falsely marketed a hair growth product. Specifically, Pure Radiance advertised that its product Re-Nourish could help an individual regrow “a thick, full head of hair, even after years of balding” and was “the world’s first and only hair loss solution that revives dead hair follicles” to regrow hair “in just 30 days.” The advertisement also showed a before-and-after picture of a man’s head, with the before picture showing a balding head and the after picture showing a full head of hair. Based on this advertisement, Hoffman purchased the product and then, after researching the product but before ever trying it himself, filed a proposed class action alleging, among other things, that the ad contained material misrepresentations and that he suffered an ascertainable loss by reason of his purchase of the product for $108.90. Significantly, Hoffman did not receive the...

Eighth Circuit Rules That Plaintiff Can File Motion to Strike Class Action Without Waiving Right to Compel Arbitration

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Posted in Class Action Defense

On July 15, 2021

In Donelson v. Ameriprise Financial Services, Inc., the Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded a district court’s decision that had denied both a motion to strike class action allegations and a motion to compel arbitration. The plaintiff was invited to create an Ameriprise account by defendant Sachse, who worked as a broker and investment advisor at defendant Ameriprise. The two met over lunch, where Sachse brought, and filled out himself, a copy of the account application. After the account application was signed, but not read, by the plaintiff, it was alleged that Sachse “badly mishandled [Plaintiff’s] investment account.” The plaintiff brought suit alleging violations of § 10(b) and § 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5, as well as breach of fiduciary duty under 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6, and, after finding other Sachse clients who had experienced similar problems with their accounts, sought to represent them in a Rule 23(b)(2) class action. The defendants moved to strike the class action allegations and to compel arbitration, which the district court denied. The defendants appealed. On appeal, the court addressed the question of whether the defendants waived their right to arbitrate when they simultaneously moved to strike the class action allegations. The court found that they had not. Ultimately, the court determined that when the defendants...

Class Action Dismissal Highlights Limits to the “Picking Off” Exception to Mootness

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Posted in Class Action Defense

On May 12, 2021

The District of New Jersey recently dismissed a putative class action lawsuit against Capital One Bank, finding the plaintiff’s recovery during the suit of the full amount of damages sought mooted her claim. The would-be class representative, plaintiff Ellen Fensterer, sued Capital One Bank to recover funds used to purchase British Airways flight tickets. After COVID-19 imposed travel restrictions and caused the flights to be canceled, Fensterer sought recovery of $4,906.31 in expended funds and rewards points. Neither British Airways nor Capital One Bank provided Fensterer’s requested refund, causing Fensterer to file a putative class action against Capital One Bank—and not British Airways—for recovery of the funds. Then, during the pendency of the lawsuit, British Airways issued the full refund sought by Fensterer, and Capital One Bank processed that refund and credited Fensterer’s account. Because a non-party ultimately provided the exact remedy sought, the District of New Jersey applied the general rule of mootness, rather than the “picking off” exception, and accordingly dismissed Fensterer’s claim. The “picking off” exception prevents the loophole that would otherwise allow Capital One Bank (or any defendant) to simply buy off the named plaintiff’s claims before class certification, thereby preventing class certification indefinitely, causing piecemeal litigation, and undermining the purpose of class action litigation generally. But that did not happen...

District Courts Now Split on Whether Provision in TCPA is Unconstitutional

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Posted in Class Action Defense

On May 11, 2021

Earlier this year, we wrote about Lindenbaum v. Realgy, a decision from the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, which dismissed the plaintiff’s “robocall” class action under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), based on the Supreme Court’s 2020 holding that a statutory exception for automated calls to collect government debts was unconstitutional. Because 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) was unconstitutional at the time of the alleged violations, the district court determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction and dismissed the lawsuit. Lindenbaum is currently on appeal before the Sixth Circuit (No. 20-4252). On March 18, 2021, the ACLU joined the fight by filing an amicus brief in support of the defendant, arguing that the defendant cannot be held “liable under a discriminatory statutory scheme that punishes only disfavored speakers.” Since Lindenbaum, the Middle District of Florida, in Hussain v. Sullivan Buick-Cadillac-GMC Truck, Inc., also held that this provision in the TCPA is unconstitutional. Similar to Lindenbaum, the plaintiff in Hussain alleged that she received pre-recorded phone calls and voicemails from the defendants without her consent. The defendants sought dismissal of the plaintiff’s complaint, alleging that the TCPA was unconstitutional and unenforceable during the time the phone calls were made, due to the unconstitutional provision. The Middle District of Florida, relying on Lindenbaum...

Third Circuit Affirms That CFA and PLA Claims Can Coexist Independently

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Posted in Class Action Defense

On March 4, 2021

We recently blogged about a New Jersey Supreme Court decision in which the court held that claims under New Jersey’s Consumer Fraud Act (CFA) may be brought in the same action as claims under the Products Liability Act (PLA). In a follow-up to that case, the Third Circuit in Sun Chemical Corporation v. Fike Corporation and Suppression Systems, Inc. applied the New Jersey Supreme Court’s guidance on the interplay between the CFA and PLA. The Third Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part a District Court judgment, finding that some of the claims were “absorbed by the PLA” and some could be brought independently pursuant to the CFA. Sun sued defendant Fike under the CFA for alleged misrepresentations related to Sun’s purchase of an explosion-suppression system. Sun alleged that Fike “misrepresented various aspects of the suppression system in its pre-purchase conversations” and that Fike was therefore liable for injuries and property damages suffered by Sun from an explosion that occurred at Sun’s facility. The District Court of New Jersey determined that Sun’s CFA claims were precluded and absorbed by the PLA because “Sun was seeking damages because various features of the suppression system failed and that failure caused personal injury to Sun’s employees.” The CFA, the District Court reasoned, could not be used to...

Sixth Circuit Holds Faxes Seeking Recipient’s Information Are a Pretext to Advertisement and Thus Within the Purview of the TCPA

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Posted in Class Action Defense

On October 26, 2020

The Sixth Circuit in Matthew N. Fulton, D.D.S., P.C. v. Enclarity, Inc., on remand from the Supreme Court, upheld its previous ruling that faxes seeking the recipient’s information are considered a “pretext” to an advertisement, and thus fall within the scope of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA). The June 19, 2020 decision relies upon a 2006 Federal Communications Commission (FCC) Order stating that “any surveys that serve as a pretext to an advertisement are subject to the TCPA’s facsimile advertising rules.” The fax requested that the recipient verify or update its information with Defendant LexisNexis “for clinical summaries, prescription renewals, and other sensitive communications.” Plaintiff’s Complaint alleged that this constituted a pretext to send additional marketing materials to recipients, as well as obtain the recipient’s involvement in Defendant LexisNexis’s database. Plaintiff asserted that Defendants and third parties would use the recipient’s data to send information “regarding products, services, competitions, and promotions,” thereby constituting “a pretext to increase awareness and use of Defendants’ proprietary database service and increase traffic to Defendants’ website.” Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the fax did not constitute an advertisement as defined by the TCPA. The Michigan district court dismissed, finding that since the fax did not state that anything was available for purchase or sale, it “lack[ed] the commercial...

New Jersey Supreme Court Holds That CFA and PLA Claims Can Be Pleaded in the Same Action

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Posted in Class Action Defense

On October 21, 2020

In a recent decision answering a question certified to it by the Third Circuit, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that claims brought under New Jersey’s Consumer Fraud Act (CFA) may be brought in the same action as claims brought pursuant to the Products Liability Act (PLA), provided each claim is based on distinct conduct. In Sun Chemical Corporation v. Fike Corporation and Suppression Systems, Inc., the Court explained that it is the nature of the actions—not the resulting damages—that determines when claims may be brought under either the CFA or the PLA. The Court clarified that CFA claims may be brought in instances where a party alleges “express misrepresentations — deceptive, fraudulent, misleading, and other unconscionable commercial practices,” while PLA claims are reserved for claims based upon “product manufacturing, warning, or design defects.” The claims in Sun Chemical arose out of the plaintiff’s purchase of an explosion isolation and suppression system from the defendant to be used to “prevent and contain potential explosions” in the plaintiff’s new dust collection system. Plaintiff’s federal court complaint alleged that on the first day it used the suppression system, a fire broke out in the dust collection system and while the alarm in the suppression system was activated, it was inaudible. Plaintiff alleged that, as a result, several...

Third Circuit Reverses Denial of Class Certification: Holds Ascertainability Satisfied Even with Gaps in Records

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Posted in Class Action Defense

On September 17, 2020

On September 9, 2020, a split panel of the Third Circuit issued a precedential opinion in Hargrove v. Sleepy’s LLC, reversing the denial of class certification because the district court “misapplied” the Circuit’s ascertainability case law and was “too exacting” when it “essentially demanded” that plaintiffs identify the class members at the certification stage. The circuit court also determined that the district court erroneously applied the motion-for-reconsideration standard to plaintiffs’ renewed motion for class certification, and held that courts should apply “the usual Rule 23 standard.” In Hargrove, the plaintiffs, delivery drivers, brought an employee misclassification suit alleging that defendant misclassified them as independent contractors, rather than employees, and thus violated several New Jersey labor laws. The district court denied class certification, twice, on the ground that the ascertainability requirement was not satisfied. In denying plaintiffs’ renewed motion for certification, the Court held that plaintiffs’ proposed class was “not ascertainable because the records kept by Sleepy’s regarding the identity of the drivers lacked critical information.” The plaintiffs sought leave to appeal pursuant to Rule 23(f), and the Third Circuit granted their request. First, the circuit court addressed the split among the district courts, both in and out of the Third Circuit, on the issue of the standard that applies to renewed motions for class certification....

Third Circuit Affirms Class Certification in In re Suboxone Antirust Litigation

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Posted in Class Action Defense

On August 10, 2020

On July 28, 2020, the Third Circuit in In re Suboxone (Buprenorphine Hydrochloride & Nalaxone) Antitrust Litigation, affirmed certification of a direct purchaser class, concluding that common evidence existed to prove the plaintiffs’ antitrust theory and resulting injury and that the proposed class representative, Burlington Drug Company, Inc., was an adequate class representative. The direct-purchaser plaintiffs alleged that the defendant drug manufacturer of the opioid-treatment drug, Suboxone, engaged in anticompetitive conduct that impeded the entry of generic versions of the drug into the market. Specifically, plaintiffs asserted that defendant “shifted the market” from Suboxone tablets to Suboxone film by the time generic tablets entered the market, thereby maintaining a monopoly and suppressing competition. According to plaintiffs, the defendant’s transition from tablets to film was coupled with six tactics to “eliminate demand for Suboxone tablets and to coerce prescribers to prefer film,” including making false statements about the safety of the tablets and withdrawing brand-name Suboxone tablets from the market. The plaintiffs argued that due to defendant’s anticompetitive conduct, they paid more for brand Suboxone products than they would have for generic tablets. The district court certified the class, and the Third Circuit granted the defendant’s petition for leave to appeal under Rule 23(f). First, the Third Circuit addressed defendant’s argument that plaintiffs did not provide...

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