Tagged: Class Actions

Third Circuit Reverses Denial of Class Certification: Holds Ascertainability Satisfied Even with Gaps in Records

On September 9, 2020, a split panel of the Third Circuit issued a precedential opinion in Hargrove v. Sleepy’s LLC, reversing the denial of class certification because the district court “misapplied” the Circuit’s ascertainability case law and was “too exacting” when it “essentially demanded” that plaintiffs identify the class members at the certification stage. The circuit court also determined that the district court erroneously applied the motion-for-reconsideration standard to plaintiffs’ renewed motion for class certification, and held that courts should apply “the usual Rule 23 standard.” In Hargrove, the plaintiffs, delivery drivers, brought an employee misclassification suit alleging that defendant misclassified them as independent contractors, rather than employees, and thus violated several New Jersey labor laws. The district court denied class certification, twice, on the ground that the ascertainability requirement was not satisfied. In denying plaintiffs’ renewed motion for certification, the Court held that plaintiffs’ proposed class was “not ascertainable because the records kept by Sleepy’s regarding the identity of the drivers lacked critical information.” The plaintiffs sought leave to appeal pursuant to Rule 23(f), and the Third Circuit granted their request. First, the circuit court addressed the split among the district courts, both in and out of the Third Circuit, on the issue of the standard that applies to renewed motions for class certification....

Third Circuit Affirms Class Certification in In re Suboxone Antirust Litigation

On July 28, 2020, the Third Circuit in In re Suboxone (Buprenorphine Hydrochloride & Nalaxone) Antitrust Litigation, affirmed certification of a direct purchaser class, concluding that common evidence existed to prove the plaintiffs’ antitrust theory and resulting injury and that the proposed class representative, Burlington Drug Company, Inc., was an adequate class representative. The direct-purchaser plaintiffs alleged that the defendant drug manufacturer of the opioid-treatment drug, Suboxone, engaged in anticompetitive conduct that impeded the entry of generic versions of the drug into the market. Specifically, plaintiffs asserted that defendant “shifted the market” from Suboxone tablets to Suboxone film by the time generic tablets entered the market, thereby maintaining a monopoly and suppressing competition. According to plaintiffs, the defendant’s transition from tablets to film was coupled with six tactics to “eliminate demand for Suboxone tablets and to coerce prescribers to prefer film,” including making false statements about the safety of the tablets and withdrawing brand-name Suboxone tablets from the market. The plaintiffs argued that due to defendant’s anticompetitive conduct, they paid more for brand Suboxone products than they would have for generic tablets. The district court certified the class, and the Third Circuit granted the defendant’s petition for leave to appeal under Rule 23(f). First, the Third Circuit addressed defendant’s argument that plaintiffs did not provide...

New Jersey Supreme Court Holds That Individualized Proof of Damages Is Required Absent a Basis for Presumption of Class-Wide Damages Capable of Reliable Mathematical Calculation

In Little v. Kia Motors America, Inc., a litigation spanning nearly two decades, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that, although aggregate proof of damages can be appropriate in some settings, individualized proof of damages based on the actual costs incurred by the class members was required in the case before it. Class members had to show they incurred “actual costs” as a result of an alleged defect in order to recover damages. In 2001, plaintiff filed a putative class action asserting breach of warranty and other claims on her behalf and on behalf of other New Jersey owners and lessees of certain Kia models. Plaintiff alleged that the vehicles had a defective brake system which rendered the vehicles’ front brakes susceptible to premature wear. After a four-week trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff and the class on the class-wide warranty claim, awarding zero damages for alleged diminution-in-value but $750 per class member on the out-of-pocket loss theory, which had been premised on an expert’s estimate of the amount of money an average owner would pay for brake repairs over the vehicles’ lives as a result of the alleged defect. On defendant’s motion for a new trial and to decertify for purposes of repair damages, the trial court decertified the class...

Third Circuit Holds Solicitations to Purchase Products and for Participation in Surveys can be Advertisements Under the TCPA

On May 15, 2020, the Third Circuit in Fishbein v. Olson Research Group, Inc. held “that solicitations to buy products, goods, or services can be advertisements under the TCPA and that solicitations for participation in . . . surveys in exchange for [money] by the sender were for services within the TCPA” making such solicitations advertisements that fall within the TCPA’s ambit. This opinion comes just one year after the Third Circuit issued its precedential decision in Mauthe v. Optum, Inc., holding that, in order for a fax to be considered an advertisement under the TCPA, “there must be a nexus between the fax and the purchasing decision of an ultimate purchaser whether the recipient of the fax or a third party,” meaning that “the fax must promote goods or services to be bought or sold, and it should have profit as an aim.” The consolidated appeal in Fishbein arose from two District Court decisions, Fishbein v. Olson Research Group, Inc., which involved a fax offering the recipient money in exchange for participating in a medical study, and Mauthe v. ITC, Inc., which involved faxes that offered the recipient money in exchange for completing surveys. After applying the Third Circuit’s precedential opinion in Optum, the District Courts dismissed the plaintiffs’ cases under Federal Rule of...

Third Circuit Reverses Class Certification in In re Lamictal Direct Purchaser & Antitrust Consumer Litig.; Next up, In re Suboxone

On April 22, 2020, the Third Circuit in In re Lamictal Direct Purchaser & Antitrust Consumer Litig., reversed class certification, concluding that the evidence did not establish that common proofs could be used to prove class-wide injury. The circuit court faulted the district court’s predominance analysis for failing to resolve factual disputes, weigh competing expert evidence, and make a prediction as to how these issues would play out at trial. Central to the ruling was the issue of antitrust impact. After brand and generic pharmaceutical manufacturers of the prescription drug Lamictal, or generic lamotrigine, settled a patent litigation, direct purchasers of these drugs sued claiming the settlement violated the antitrust laws as an impermissible “reverse payment agreement.” The brand manufacturer was alleged to have “paid” the generic to stay out of the market by promising not to launch an authorized generic (“AG”). The direct payor plaintiffs argued that they paid more for the drugs than they would have otherwise based on the theory that, on average, the price of a generic is lower when there are two generics rather than just one. The Third Circuit granted the manufacturer-defendants’ petition for leave to appeal under Rule 23(f). First, the Third Circuit rejected direct purchasers’ argument that certification was controlled by a comment in Tyson Foods v....

Supreme Court Holds That 14-Day Appeal Deadline Established by Rule 23(f) Cannot Be Tolled

On February 26, 2019, the Supreme Court unanimously held in Nutraceutical Corporation v. Lambert, that the 14-day deadline imposed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f), seeking permission to appeal an order granting or denying class certification, cannot be tolled. After initially certifying a class, the District Court, on February 20, 2015, decertified the class after finding that common issues did not predominate among the class members. Pursuant to Rule 23(f)’s 14-day deadline, the plaintiff, Lambert, had until March 5, 2015 to seek permission to appeal. But, on March 2, 2015, Lambert orally informed the District Court that he would seek reconsideration and did not file his motion for reconsideration until March 12, 2015. Lambert’s motion for reconsideration was denied on June 24, 2015. Fourteen days after that, almost four months past his 14-day deadline, Lambert petitioned the Ninth Circuit seeking permission to appeal the District Court’s order decertifying the class. The Court of Appeals granted Lambert’s petition, finding that the 14-day deadline under Rule 23(f) should be tolled given the circumstances. Specifically, the Court of Appeals found that because Lambert had informed the court within 14 days that he would be seeking reconsideration, he acted diligently. The Supreme Court disagreed, however, and found that the 14-day deadline imposed by Rule 23(f) could not be...

District of New Jersey’s Dismissal of Securities Class Action Reiterates Significant Hurdles to Sufficiently Pleading Scienter

A decision last week from the District of New Jersey is the latest of several recent decisions from the District and the Third Circuit making clear that securities fraud plaintiffs face a high bar in pleading an inference of scienter strong enough to withstand a motion to dismiss. In In re Electronics For Imaging, Inc. Securities Litigation, Plaintiffs brought a securities fraud class action alleging that Electronics For Imaging, Inc. (EFI), and two of its executives, violated sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5. According to Plaintiffs, Defendants falsely assured investors in a Form 10-K and Form 10-Q (and accompanying Sarbanes Oxley certifications) that EFI’s internal controls over financial reporting were functional and effective—including by asserting that those controls had been reviewed, evaluated, and improved. A subsequent press release and amendments to the Form 10-K and Form 10-Q identified material weaknesses in EFI’s internal controls. Plaintiffs filed suit in the wake of a drop in EFI stock price that occurred after the press release was issued. Defendants moved to dismiss for failure to sufficiently plead scienter. In support of scienter, Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants’ record keeping practices so egregiously violated generally accepted accounting principles that Defendants either: (i) lied when they asserted they had previously reviewed and evaluated...

Accepting the Risks of Arbitration Clauses: The Southern District of New York Upholds Arbitrator’s Decision Allowing Class-Wide Arbitration

On January 2, 2019, the Southern District of New York (SDNY) in Wells Fargo Advisors LLC v. Tucker, declined to vacate an arbitrator’s clause construction award, which construed the parties’ arbitration agreement as permitting class-wide arbitration. Importantly, prior decisions from the SDNY and Second Circuit concluded the parties’ arbitration agreement clearly and unmistakably expressed the parties’ intent that an arbitrator should decide the gateway issue of whether the agreement permitted class arbitration. Having delegated that authority to the arbitrator, the District Court found no basis in law to overturn that clause construction award. The two prior decisions in this matter, addressing the issue of who should decide whether an agreement permits class arbitration, align well with the United States Supreme Court’s January 9, 2019 holding in Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc. There—resolving a circuit split—the High Court held that when the parties’ contract delegates the arbitrability question to an arbitrator, a court may not override the contract, and possesses no power to decide the arbitrability issue, even if the court believes the argument that the arbitration agreement applies to a particular dispute is “wholly groundless.” The clause construction award in Wells Fargo Advisors LLC arose out of a claim by Wells Fargo financial advisors that Wells Fargo, through policy, did not...

Third Circuit Rejects Buyer’s Remorse as a Cognizable Injury Under Article III

In In Re: Johnson & Johnson Talcum Powder Products Marketing, Sales Practices and Products Liability Litigation, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that buyer’s remorse, without more, does not constitute an economic injury sufficient to establish standing under Article III of the United States Constitution. Plaintiff brought a putative class action against defendant Johnson & Johnson, alleging that perineal use of defendant’s baby powder by women could lead to an increased risk of ovarian cancer. Plaintiff did not allege that she had developed or was at an increased risk of developing ovarian cancer. Nor did she allege that the product was defective in performing the functions for which it was advertised. Furthermore, Plaintiff had used all the product and, thus, was not seeking reimbursement for a product she cannot use. Rather, Plaintiff alleged that she would not have bought the baby powder had she known that it could lead to an increased risk of cancer. The District Court of New Jersey dismissed her complaint for lack of Article III standing. The Third Circuit affirmed. It relied on its analyses in Finkelman v. Nat’l Football League and Cottrell v. Alcon Laboratories to determine that Plaintiff’s allegations were too conjectural to establish standing. It explained that, although a plaintiff need not allege the exact...

Eleventh and Seventh Circuits Hold Class and Collective Arbitration Are Questions of Arbitrability

In two recent precedential decisions, JPay, Inc. v. Kobel and Herrington v. Waterstone Mortgage Corp., the Eleventh and Seventh Circuits, respectively, held that whether an arbitration may proceed on a class-wide basis (or as a collective action when a claimant is seeking relief under the Fair Labor Standard Act) is a “question of arbitrability” to be decided by the courts, unless the parties specifically delegate that responsibility to an arbitrator. The Supreme Court previously noted the lack of a majority decision on the subject in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp. and declined to address this question in Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, leaving the decision to the circuits. In JPay, the dispute arose when two plaintiffs, users of JPay’s fee-for-service amenities to send money to inmates, filed suit alleging the service dissuaded users from sending funds through free paper money orders, and that the fees charged by JPay were “exorbitant” and used to “fund kickbacks to corrections departments.” JPay’s Terms of Service included a provision that the American Arbitration Association (AAA) would arbitrate and govern any disputes, claims, or controversies that arose between the parties and “[t]he ability to arbitrate the dispute, claim or controversy shall likewise be determined in arbitration.” The plaintiffs filed a demand for arbitration on a class basis, and, in response,...