Gibbons Law Alert
Kolon USA, Inc., the U.S. subsidiary of South Korea-based Kolon Industries Inc. (“Kolon”), recently was ordered by New Jersey District Court Judge Esther Salas to turn over its property to DuPont as part of DuPont’s efforts to enforce the $920 million damages award that DuPont won against Kolon during a 2011 trade secrets litigation in the Eastern District of Virginia.
The New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (“CFA”) allows parties to recover damages if they have suffered an ascertainable loss. See N.J.S.A. 56:8-19. In the recent decision from the New Jersey Appellate Division, Pope v. Craftsman Builders, Inc., the court considered the type of evidence that can provide proof of an ascertainable loss in the context of a CFA claim involving a construction project.
In PhatRat Technology, LLC v. Riddell, PhatRat, the purported exclusive licensee of U.S. Patent Nos. 7,386,401 and 7,693,668 relating to helmet impact reporting technology (“the PhatRat patents”), sued sporting goods manufacturer Riddell in the Northern District of Illinois for infringement of the PhatRat patents. The PhatRat patents issued in June 2008 and April 2010, respectively.
The Third Circuit’s 94-page opinion in antitrust case ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., issued on September 28, 2012, offers something for everyone in its smorgasbord of holdings concerning the law of exclusive dealing, proof of damages, and Article III standing. The opinion is most notable for rejecting the notion that above-cost prices can render an otherwise unlawful exclusive dealing agreement lawful, reinforcing the viability of de facto exclusive-dealing arrangements under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, and ratcheting up the gatekeeper role courts play under Daubert.
Recently, the Second Circuit vacated a District Court’s dismissal of a securities fraud action brought by Acticon AG, shareholder of China North East Petroleum Holdings Ltd. (“NEP”), for failure to plead economic loss—a necessary element to maintain a private damages action under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“§10(b)”). Acticon had multiple opportunities to, but did not, sell its NEP shares at a profit after NEP’s disclosure of the alleged fraud. The Court held that economic loss is not conclusively negated at the pleadings stage where the price of a security recovers shortly after a disclosure of alleged fraud. Significantly, in drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff under NEP’s 12(b)(6) motion, the Court explained that a rise in the price of a stock following a corrective disclosure requires an inquiry into whether the security rose for “reasons unrelated to [the] initial drop,” and thus introduces factual questions and competing theories of causation that would be inappropriate to resolve on a motion to dismiss.
On May 21, 2012, the New Jersey Supreme Court issued a corrected Opinion in W.J.A. v. D.A.. In that Opinion, the Court held that presumed damages continue to play a role in New Jersey’s defamation jurisprudence in private plaintiff cases that do not involve matters of public concern. Where a plaintiff does not proffer any evidence of actual damage to reputation, the doctrine of presumed damages permits him/her to survive a motion for summary judgment and to obtain nominal damages if successful at trial. The Court emphasized, however, that in order to receive compensatory damages, a plaintiff must prove actual harm to his/her reputation.
The Third Circuit’s recent decision in Atlantic Health System Inc. v. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh confirms the importance of strictly following the notice requirements of a claims-made policy and the relevance of the parties’ course of prior and subsequent performance on the ultimate interpretation of allegedly ambiguous policy terms and conditions. In this case, the failure to strictly comply with the notice requirements resulted in AHS retaining liability for more than $2 million of defense costs and settlement payments.
In the latest chapter of the ongoing case of Quinlan v. Curtiss-Wright Corporation, the New Jersey Appellate Division has ruled that while an employer, found to have terminated an employee in violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“the LAD”), has the burden of persuasion to establish a plaintiff’s failure to mitigate damages with respect to back pay, the employer does not have the burden of persuasion with respect to a plaintiff’s failure to mitigate future losses, including front pay. In reversing a jury award for front pay in the amount of $3,650,318 because of improper jury instructions on the front pay issue, the Appellate Division suggested a framework for proper jury instructions on front pay damages and referred the issue to the Model Civil Jury Charge Committee. The Court also reversed the jury’s punitive damages award of over $4.5 million, concluding that that award was linked to the front pay award. The Court held that a new trial was required on both the front pay issue and on punitive damages.
In a case of particular interest to New Jersey employers, the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled on June 9, 2011, in Donelson v. DuPont Chambers Works (A-112-09) that an employee who files suit under the Conscientious Employee Protection Act (“CEPA”) may recover back and front pay, even if the employee was not fired or constructively discharged, if the employee can show that he became mentally disabled as a result of the employer’s retaliation. The Court rejected the conclusion of the Appellate Division that the same standards govern remedies under CEPA and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“LAD”), and that a constructive discharge must be proven to obtain back and front pay damages.
The Supreme Court in Montana v. Wyoming –U.S.–, 131 S.Ct. 1765 (2011), rejected Montana’s claim that Wyoming’s usage of water depleted the amount of water available to it under the Yellowstone River Compact between Montana and Wyoming. Montana contended that Wyoming breached Article V(A) of the Compact which provided that “appropriative rights to the beneficial uses of the water of the Yellowstone River System existing in each signatory State as of January 1, 1950, shall continue to be enjoyed in accordance with the laws governing the acquisition and use of water under the doctrine of appropriation.”