Tagged: Motion to Dismiss Granted

Class Action Dismissal Highlights Limits to the “Picking Off” Exception to Mootness

The District of New Jersey recently dismissed a putative class action lawsuit against Capital One Bank, finding the plaintiff’s recovery during the suit of the full amount of damages sought mooted her claim. The would-be class representative, plaintiff Ellen Fensterer, sued Capital One Bank to recover funds used to purchase British Airways flight tickets. After COVID-19 imposed travel restrictions and caused the flights to be canceled, Fensterer sought recovery of $4,906.31 in expended funds and rewards points. Neither British Airways nor Capital One Bank provided Fensterer’s requested refund, causing Fensterer to file a putative class action against Capital One Bank—and not British Airways—for recovery of the funds. Then, during the pendency of the lawsuit, British Airways issued the full refund sought by Fensterer, and Capital One Bank processed that refund and credited Fensterer’s account. Because a non-party ultimately provided the exact remedy sought, the District of New Jersey applied the general rule of mootness, rather than the “picking off” exception, and accordingly dismissed Fensterer’s claim. The “picking off” exception prevents the loophole that would otherwise allow Capital One Bank (or any defendant) to simply buy off the named plaintiff’s claims before class certification, thereby preventing class certification indefinitely, causing piecemeal litigation, and undermining the purpose of class action litigation generally. But that did not happen...

District Courts Now Split on Whether Provision in TCPA is Unconstitutional

Earlier this year, we wrote about Lindenbaum v. Realgy, a decision from the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, which dismissed the plaintiff’s “robocall” class action under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), based on the Supreme Court’s 2020 holding that a statutory exception for automated calls to collect government debts was unconstitutional. Because 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) was unconstitutional at the time of the alleged violations, the district court determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction and dismissed the lawsuit. Lindenbaum is currently on appeal before the Sixth Circuit (No. 20-4252). On March 18, 2021, the ACLU joined the fight by filing an amicus brief in support of the defendant, arguing that the defendant cannot be held “liable under a discriminatory statutory scheme that punishes only disfavored speakers.” Since Lindenbaum, the Middle District of Florida, in Hussain v. Sullivan Buick-Cadillac-GMC Truck, Inc., also held that this provision in the TCPA is unconstitutional. Similar to Lindenbaum, the plaintiff in Hussain alleged that she received pre-recorded phone calls and voicemails from the defendants without her consent. The defendants sought dismissal of the plaintiff’s complaint, alleging that the TCPA was unconstitutional and unenforceable during the time the phone calls were made, due to the unconstitutional provision. The Middle District of Florida, relying on Lindenbaum...

Second District Court to Dismiss Claims Based on Unconstitutional Statute Provision

In Lindenbaum v. Realgy, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio dismissed the plaintiff’s “robo-call” class action under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), based on the Supreme Court’s 2020 holding that a statutory exception for automated calls to collect government debts was unconstitutional. Because the statute was unconstitutional at the time of the alleged violations, the district court determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction and dismissed the lawsuit. Originally enacted in 1991, the TCPA restricts almost all prerecorded sales calls to cell phones. In 2015, Congress amended the provision to allow prerecorded calls “made solely to collect a debt owed to or guaranteed by the United States.” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). The 2015 provision was struck down in 2020 by the United States Supreme Court’s plurality decision in Barr v. American Association of Political Consultants, Inc. While the Supreme Court struck down the portion of the statute dealing with calls for government debt, it left the rest intact. In Lindenbaum, the plaintiff brought a class action lawsuit alleging violations of the TCPA. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that she received two prerecorded calls, one to her cellphone and one to her landline, and had not provided express written consent to receive these calls. The plaintiff argued that the severance of the...

Second Circuit Affirms Expansive Reach of Preemption Provision of Food Drug and Cosmetic Act, Defeating False Labeling Class Action Premised Upon Consumer Protection Statutes

On May 11, 2020, the Second Circuit in Critcher v. L’Oréal USA, Inc., affirmed the dismissal of a putative class action, holding that the broad preemption clause of the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”), 21 U.S.C. § 379s, barred plaintiffs from seeking to impose additional or different labeling requirements through their state consumer protection law claims, where Congress and the FDA already had provided for specific labeling requirements. In Critcher, purchasers of the defendant’s “liquid cosmetics” products claimed that while the net-quantities on the products’ labels were accurate, the product packaging was misleading because it omitted critical information that the creams could not be fully dispensed from the containers. Because they could not utilize the represented quantity of product, the plaintiffs claimed that they were deceived into buying more of the cosmetics than they could use. The District Court dismissed the complaint, concluding, among other things, that the claims were expressly preempted by the FDCA, and alternatively, preempted by the Federal Packaging Labeling Act (FPLA), 15 U.S.C. § 1451, et seq. On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that mere compliance with that net quantity disclosure requirement was not enough because it had the effect of making the packaging misleading in that a consumer would think the amount identified on the label is the amount accessible....

Supreme Court Further Restricts Class Arbitration Finding It Must be Unambiguously Authorized

In a 5-4 decision authored by Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh, the U.S. Supreme Court in Lamps Plus Inc. v. Varella held that courts may not infer from an ambiguous agreement that parties have consented to arbitrate on a classwide basis. Lamps Plus Inc. v. Varella involved an employee who had filed a class action against his employer. Lamps Plus responded by seeking to compel arbitration on an individual rather than a classwide basis. The district court dismissed the case and compelled arbitration, but on a class basis. Lamps Plus appealed, and the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning hinged on the fact that the arbitration agreement was ambiguous about the availability of class arbitration. The Ninth Circuit thus distinguished Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U. S. 662 (2010), arguing that in Stolt-Nielsen the parties had stipulated that the agreement was silent about class arbitration, whereas the parties had no such stipulation in Lamps Plus. Because the Ninth Circuit held that the agreement was ambiguous, the appellate court turned to California’s contra proferentem rule and held that this state law contract principle required the court to interpret the ambiguous language against the drafter—here, Lamps Plus. The Supreme Court reversed because the principle...

Third Circuit Rejects Buyer’s Remorse as a Cognizable Injury Under Article III

In In Re: Johnson & Johnson Talcum Powder Products Marketing, Sales Practices and Products Liability Litigation, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that buyer’s remorse, without more, does not constitute an economic injury sufficient to establish standing under Article III of the United States Constitution. Plaintiff brought a putative class action against defendant Johnson & Johnson, alleging that perineal use of defendant’s baby powder by women could lead to an increased risk of ovarian cancer. Plaintiff did not allege that she had developed or was at an increased risk of developing ovarian cancer. Nor did she allege that the product was defective in performing the functions for which it was advertised. Furthermore, Plaintiff had used all the product and, thus, was not seeking reimbursement for a product she cannot use. Rather, Plaintiff alleged that she would not have bought the baby powder had she known that it could lead to an increased risk of cancer. The District Court of New Jersey dismissed her complaint for lack of Article III standing. The Third Circuit affirmed. It relied on its analyses in Finkelman v. Nat’l Football League and Cottrell v. Alcon Laboratories to determine that Plaintiff’s allegations were too conjectural to establish standing. It explained that, although a plaintiff need not allege the exact...

Ninth Circuit Adopts Expansive Definition of Autodialer Under the TCPA, Creating Circuit Split With Third Circuit

In Marks v. Crunch San Diego, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, considering anew the statutory definition of automatic telephone dialing system (ATDS) under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), held that an ATDS includes a device that stores telephone numbers to be called, “whether or not those numbers have been generated by a random or sequential number generator.” The Ninth Circuit expressly declined to follow the Third Circuit’s interpretation of ATDS in Dominguez v. Yahoo, Inc., thus setting up a clear Circuit split. Both Marks and Dominguez were issued after the D.C. Circuit invalidated the FCC’s interpretation of ATDS in ACA International v. Federal Communications Commission. In Marks, plaintiff brought a TCPA class action after receiving three text messages from Crunch Fitness where he had a gym membership, asserting that the texts were sent using an ATDS. The messaging system was a “web-based marketing platform designed to send promotional text messages to a list of stored telephone numbers.” Phone numbers were either manually entered into the system or provided directly by customers. To send text campaigns, a Crunch employee would log in, select the intended recipients, generate the content of a message, and select the time and date for the transmittal of the text messages. The district court granted summary judgment on the ground...

New Jersey Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Four Putative Class Actions Claiming Violations of Section 16 of the TCCWNA

In Duke v. All American Ford, the New Jersey Appellate Division affirmed dismissal of four putative class actions (consolidated for appeal) alleging that agreements to purchase, lease, or rent motor vehicles violated the Truth in Consumer Contracts, Warranty, and Notice Act’s (TCCWNA) Section 16. The trial courts had dismissed all such claims for failure to plead a violation of Section 16. While the appeals in these matters were pending, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Spade v. Select Comfort, holding that “an adverse consequence is a necessary element of the TCCWNA cause of action.” As a result of the Supreme Court’s decision in Spade, the Appellate Division in Duke rejected the appeals and affirmed the orders of dismissal without even considering the various substantive Section 16 arguments. Each of the putative class action complaints alleged that certain clauses in purchase, lease, or rental documents violated Section 16 of the TCCWNA, which, among other things, prohibits language in a written contract “that any of its provisions is or may be void, unenforceable, or inapplicable in some jurisdictions without specifying which provisions are or are not void, unenforceable or inapplicable within the State of New Jersey.” Three of the cases (Duke, Barbarino, and Greenberg), involved contracts for the lease or purchase of vehicles, which contained a...

TCPA Update: When Revocation of Consent Is Unreasonable

The District of New Jersey recently made clear that when attempting to cancel unwanted commercial text messages, if the recipient does not follow the sender’s simple instructions, any other attempts to revoke consent to the text messages may be found unreasonable. In Rando v. Edible Arrangements International, LLC, a class action lawsuit claiming violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq., plaintiff claimed that she was sent commercial text messages from defendant using an automatic telephone dialing system (“ATDS”). Though plaintiff had originally consented to receive such text messages, and never followed defendant’s instruction to text “STOP to cancel,” the complaint alleged that plaintiff had revoked her consent to receive the messages via other return text messages of varying content and that defendant had impermissibly designated an exclusive means for the revocation of consent.” The Rando court held that the complaint failed to state a TCPA claim by failing to allege that the plaintiff’s chosen method of revoking consent was reasonable. Plaintiff had replied to the text with language which would clearly indicate to a human being that she wanted to revoke her consent, but she did not text back “STOP” as instructed in the original text itself. Although District Court Judge Simandle found that the FCC’s statements on...

California District Court Dismisses Facebook’s TCCWNA “Website Terms and Conditions” Lawsuit in Light of Valid Choice-of-Law Provision

New Jersey’s Truth-in-Consumer Contract, Warranty, and Notice Act (“TCCWNA”) ushered in a wave of class actions last year, targeting various provisions in retailers’ websites “terms and conditions.” Broadly speaking, the TCCWNA prohibits “consumer contracts” from containing language that violates any “clearly established legal right[s].” New Jersey courts have not been alone in adjudicating these cases, however, as a number of similar lawsuits have been brought in other jurisdictions, including California federal district courts. For example, on September 7, 2016, the Central District of California dismissed the complaint in Candelario v. Rip Curl, Inc. on standing grounds, holding that because the plaintiff’s “only connection to the Terms and Conditions appears to be her decision to read them” and because her complaint essentially alleged only “bare procedural violation[s]” of the TCCWNA – without more – she could not satisfy “the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III.” Even more recently, although on different grounds, the Northern District of California dismissed a “website terms and conditions” class action against Facebook. In Palomino v. Facebook, Inc., as in Candelario, the plaintiffs alleged that the social media company’s website terms and conditions violated the TCCWNA because of “provisions that purport to ‘1) disclaim liability for claims brought for Defendant’s negligent, willful, malicious and wanton misconduct; 2) bar claims for personal and economic injury...