Tagged: Statutory Construction

Non-Settling Insurers Now Have a Seat at the Bankruptcy Table

Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the Supreme Court’s unanimous opinion1 in Truck Insurance Exchange v. Kaiser Gypsum Company, Inc., et al. (Case No. 22-1079) (“Kaiser Gypsum”). Reversing the opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in In re Kaiser Gypsum Co., Inc., 60 F.4th 73 (4th Cir. 2023), the Court held that, pursuant to section 1109(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, “[a]n insurer with financial responsibility for a bankruptcy claim is sufficiently concerned with, or affected by, the proceedings to be a ‘party in interest’ that can raise objections to a reorganization plan.” In doing so, the Court rejected, as “conceptually wrong” and making “little practical sense,” the “insurance neutrality” doctrine that denies insurers the status of parties in interest in confirmation-related matters if the proposed plan neither increases the insurer’s pre-petition obligations nor impairs its rights under the insurance policies it has issued to the debtors. Kaiser Gypsum is an asbestos mass tort Chapter 11 case. A plan of reorganization (“KG Plan”) was confirmed on September 12, 2021. The KG plan provided, inter alia, for uninsured claims to be administered by an asbestos claims trust (“KG Asbestos Trust”), while insured claims were to be resolved through the tort system and paid (less a small deductible) by the debtors’ primary liability insurer,...

Consumer Fraud Class Action Dismissed With Prejudice: Law Enforcement Tows Are Not Covered by the New Jersey Predatory Towing Prevention Act

On June 14, 2021, Judge Thomas J. Walsh of the Superior Court of New Jersey put an end to the long-running putative class action lawsuit in Kiley v. Tumino’s Towing, which sought to exploit regulations promulgated under the Predatory Towing Prevention Act (PTPA) by the Director of the Division of Consumer Affairs (DCA). The action was removed to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act, where the magistrate judge initially denied a motion to remand and permitted jurisdictional discovery, but the district court judge later remanded back to state court. Finally addressing the merits, the Superior Court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint, with prejudice, agreeing with Tumino’s Towing that the PTPA was not applicable to the towing services requested by law enforcement and performed in accordance with a duly-authorized municipal ordinance. As such, the plaintiff’s sole remaining cause of action for alleged violation of the Consumer Fraud Act (CFA) could not stand. In Kiley, the complaint alleged that the plaintiff’s vehicle was towed by Tumino’s Towing, at the request of the Ridgefield Park Police Department, because his vehicle was illegally parked during a snow emergency. After paying his parking ticket at police headquarters, the plaintiff was given a vehicle release authorization, which he brought to Tumino’s Towing to obtain the release...

Supreme Court to Finally Decide Definition of Autodialer in TCPA Litigation

On July 9, 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court granted a long-pending petition for certiorari in Facebook Inc. v. Duguid, Noah, et al. to address a hotly debated question in Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) litigation: “whether the definition of [automated telephone dialing system] encompasses any device that can ‘store’ and ‘automatically dial’ telephone numbers, even if the device does not ‘us[e] a random or sequential number generator.’” The grant of certiorari comes on the heels of the Court’s sweeping decision in Barr v. American Ass’n of Political Consultants, severing the government debt collection exception to the TCPA’s “autodialer” prohibition as a content-based restriction on free speech. The TCPA broadly prohibits most calls using any ATDS or autodialer, defined by statute as “equipment which has the capacity – (A) to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator; and (B) to dial such numbers.” Given the lack of clarity in the statutory language, courts have grappled with whether “a random or sequential number generator” must be used to only “store” the numbers, or only to “produce” the numbers, or to “dial” the numbers after having “randomly or sequentially” generated or produced them. Further complicating court interpretations is the FCC’s interpretations stating that a dialing system known as a “predictive...

Supreme Court Severs TCPA’s Government Debt-Collection Exception as Content-Based Restriction on Free Speech, but Leaves Autodialer Restriction

The Supreme Court of the United States recently analyzed the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq., highlighting the importance of the Act’s ban on “robocalls,” (i.e., calls placed using an “automatic telephone dialing system” or “autodialer”), but leaving key questions unanswered. In Barr v. American Association of Political Consultants, Inc., the Court upheld the TCPA but severed Congress’s 2015 amendment that allowed entities to make robocalls to collect government-backed debt. Enacted in 1991, the TCPA generally prohibits robocalls to cell phones and home phones. At the heart of the Court’s opinion here was the decision whether to uphold Congress’s 2015 amendment which allowed an exception to the general ban on robocalls for entities collecting government-backed debt. The plaintiffs, organizations that participate in the political system, make calls to citizens for a multitude of purposes, such as discussing political issues, soliciting donations, and conducting polls. If robocalls to cellphones were allowed for political outreach, the plaintiffs believe that their efforts would be more effective and efficient. The plaintiffs filed a declaratory judgment action against the U.S. Attorney General and the Federal Communications Commission to invalidate the TCPA’s entire 1991 autodialer restriction, arguing that allowing certain entities to make robocalls to collect government-backed debt, but prohibiting other robocalls, was a content-based restriction...

Appellate Division Creates Split on Learned-Professionals Exception to New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act

In a recent opinion, Shaw v. Shand, the Appellate Division held that home inspectors are not “learned professionals” exempt from liability under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (CFA). Instead, the court held that only professionals who have historically been recognized as “learned” based on the requirement of extensive learning or erudition are exempt under the CFA. In Shaw, the plaintiffs hired the defendant, a licensed home inspector, to examine a home for defects. The defendant wrote a report concluding that the property was built with professional workmanship, was made of quality materials, and would only require typical maintenance and upgrades. The plaintiffs purchased the property in reliance on that report. Soon after the plaintiffs made the purchase, however, the property’s front porch collapsed. Plaintiffs then learned that the roof, windows, and sliding glass doors all leaked and required complete replacement and that the driveway would need to be replaced as well. They then discovered that the house had a significant mold problem. At the time the Appellate Division decided Shaw, the plaintiffs had spent tens of thousands of dollars repairing those conditions, and expected to spend tens of thousands more. Defendant’s inspection of plaintiffs’ home was his first as a licensed inspector. As a licensed inspector, defendant was subject to the requirements set forth...

Federal Appeals Court Directs FDA to Treat Reissue Patents as Separate and Distinct When Determining Eligibility for Pre-MMA 180-Day Exclusivity

In Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. FDA, generic drug manufacturer Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“Mylan”) challenged an FDA letter decision describing the agency’s treatment of original and reissue patents as “a single bundle of patent rights” when determining eligibility for 180-day exclusivity under the Hatch Waxman Act (pre-MMA). The United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia deferred to the FDA’s interpretation of the statute under step 2 of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc..