Tagged: Supplemental Jurisdiction

Dog Doesn’t Hunt: After Plaintiff Drops Federal Claim, U.S. Supreme Court Says Dog Food Case Must Be Remanded to State Court

The United States Supreme Court clarified this month in Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v. Wullschleger that when a plaintiff amends her complaint, following removal from state to federal court, to “cut[] out all her federal-law claims, federal-question jurisdiction dissolves” and the case must be remanded “to the state court where it started.” In Royal Canin, Anastasia Wullschleger purchased “a brand of dog food available only with a veterinarian’s prescription” and “sold at a premium price,” thinking that the dog food “contained medication not found in off-the-shelf products.” When Ms. Wullschleger learned that, despite its trappings, the dog food was just “ordinary dog food,” she brought suit in Missouri state court, filing a complaint that included asserted violations of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), as well as factually intertwined state-law claims. The defendant dog food company removed Ms. Wullschleger’s complaint from state to federal court based on federal-question jurisdiction resulting from the FDCA. In response, Ms. Wullschleger amended her complaint to remove any reference to the FDCA, and she asked the federal court to remand the case back to state court, arguing that there was no longer federal jurisdiction over the “amended, all-state-law complaint.” The district court denied Ms. Wullschleger’s petition. It reasoned that federal jurisdiction could not be unilaterally eliminated by a plaintiff’s...

Wrap-Up of United States Supreme Court’s 2017-2018 Term

With the close of the United States Supreme Court’s 2017-18 term, we offer this wrap-up, focusing on decisions of special interest from the business and commercial perspective (excluding patent cases): In a much talked-about decision in the antitrust field, the Court held in Ohio v. American Express Co. that American Express’s anti-steering provisions in its merchant contracts, which generally preclude merchants from encouraging customers to use credit cards other than American Express, are not anticompetitive and therefore do not violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act. In so holding, the Court found that credit card networks are two-sided transaction platforms, one side being the merchant and the other side being the merchant’s customer. Thus, when assessing whether the anti-steering agreements are anticompetitive, the effects on both sides of the platform must be considered. The plaintiffs’ proof that American Express had increased its merchant fees over a period of time was insufficient to show an anticompetitive effect because it neglected the customer side of the platform, where consumers have received the benefit of ever-increasing rewards from credit card companies and other improvements in services that those higher merchant fees enable. Bringing an end to a fight that New Jersey had been waging against the NCAA and professional sports leagues since 2012, the Court paved the way for...