Tagged: Trial

New Jersey Supreme Court Holds Denial of Right to Jury Trial Not Within Panoply of Sanctions in a Trial Court’s Arsenal

Recently, the New Jersey Supreme Court unanimously held that trial courts may not deprive civil litigants of their constitutionally protected right to a jury trial as a sanction for failure to comply with a procedural rule. In Williams v. American Auto Logistics, the pro se plaintiff’s complaint did not include a jury demand, but the defendant’s answer did. The defendant later sought to waive its jury demand, but the plaintiff withheld his consent, which was required by court rules. Notwithstanding the lack of consent, the trial judge granted the request to waive the jury as a sanction against the plaintiff for his failure to provide the pre-trial disclosures required by Rule 4:25-7. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s waiving of the jury as a sanction for the plaintiff’s failure to comply with Rule 4:25-7.

New Jersey Appellate Division Says Experts Cannot Serve as Conduits for Hearsay Conclusions from Non-testifying Experts

After our recent report concerning a recent New Jersey Supreme Court opinion on the use of hypothetical questions with expert witnesses, New Jersey’s Appellate Division, in a to-be-published opinion, also placed limits on appropriate questions for experts, holding that non-testifying experts’ opinions cannot be “bootstrapped” into the record by asking testifying experts if their conclusions are “consistent” with a non-testifying expert’s. James v. Ruiz, No. A-3543-13T2, 2015 N.J. Super. LEXIS 46 (App. Div. Mar. 25, 2015).

Third Circuit Affirms Plaintiffs’ Zero-Damages Antitrust Victory, Restricting the Scope of What Constitutes “Reliable” Expert Damages Data

The Third Circuit’s 94-page opinion in antitrust case ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., issued on September 28, 2012, offers something for everyone in its smorgasbord of holdings concerning the law of exclusive dealing, proof of damages, and Article III standing. The opinion is most notable for rejecting the notion that above-cost prices can render an otherwise unlawful exclusive dealing agreement lawful, reinforcing the viability of de facto exclusive-dealing arrangements under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, and ratcheting up the gatekeeper role courts play under Daubert.