Author: Richard S. Zackin

New Jersey Supreme Court Clarifies Whistleblower Law

In June 2014, the New Jersey Supreme Court, in Hitesman v. Bridgeway, Inc., affirmed the decision of a lower appellate court dismissing a claim brought by a healthcare worker under the New Jersey whistleblower law, the Conscientious Employee Protection Act, N.J.S.A. § 34:19-1 et seq. (CEPA). The decision is significant because the Supreme Court clarified the role of a trial court on the issue of whether a plaintiff has sufficiently identified a rule of law or a public policy that provides the necessary foundation for a CEPA claim.

New Jersey Appellate Court Upholds Agreements Shortening the Statute of Limitations for Employment-Related Claims

On June 19, 2014, in Rodriguez v. Raymours Furniture Company, Inc., the New Jersey Appellate Division upheld the validity of a provision in an employment application form by which the job applicant agreed that, if hired, he or she would bring any employment-related claim within 6 months after the claim arose. Plaintiff alleged he was terminated because of a disability in violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“LAD”) and in retaliation for having filed a workers compensation claim. The Appellate Division held that because the plaintiff brought these claims 9 months after his termination they were barred by the 6-month limitations period in the application form even though they were brought well within the 2-year statute of limitations period otherwise applicable to these types of claims.

EEOC Focusing on Telecommuting as a Reasonable Accommodation

The EEOC is heralding a recent decision from the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Equal Opportunity Employment Commission v. Ford Motor Co., a case in which the agency brought suit on behalf of a Ford employee who alleged she was terminated in retaliation for filing a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. In her charge, the employee alleged Ford violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) by not allowing her to telecommute to work. The district court granted Ford’s motion for summary judgment, but, in a 2-to-1 decision, the Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that the EEOC had presented evidence sufficient to survive summary judgment that (a) by requesting to telecommute the employee had sought a reasonable accommodation for her disability and (b) the alternative accommodations offered by the company were insufficient. Of concern to employers is the little weight given by the majority opinion to the employer’s business judgment that the employee’s presence in the workplace was an essential function of her job.

Supreme Court Rules that Employees of Private Contractors Can Qualify as Whistleblowers Under Sarbanes-Oxley

On March 4, 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its much anticipated decision in Lawson v. FMR LLC, resolving a dispute over the scope of the whistleblower provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7201, et seq. (“SOX”). Private contractors and subcontractors of public companies should give their attention to this decision. Although SOX is generally thought of as a statute that regulates public companies and their employees, the Lawson decision extends SOX’s whistleblower provisions to cover private companies and their employees as well.

EEOC Challenges Separation/Release Agreements

It is common practice for employers in the process of terminating employees to present separation agreements that offer the employees severance benefits in exchange for a general release of claims. On February 2, 2014, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC” or “Commission”) filed suit in federal court in Chicago against the CVS drugstore chain, alleging that, since August 2011, CVS has engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 et seq.) by using separation agreements for their non-store employees that unlawfully interfere with the rights of these employees to file charges of discrimination with the Commission.

A New Jersey Federal Court Holds that the Stored Communications Act Applies to “Wall Posts” on Facebook

The Federal Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2701, et seq. (“SCA”), makes it unlawful to, among other things, “intentionally access[] without authorization a facility through which an electronic communication service is provided.” Violators are subject to imprisonment and fines, and the statute expressly authorizes a civil action for damages, injunctive relief and attorneys fees. A federal court in New Jersey has now held that the statute may apply to those who access information posted by a Facebook account holder on his or her Facebook “wall.” The defendant-employer in the case, Monmouth-Ocean Hospital Service Corp. (“MONOC”), was able to avoid liability under the SCA because the plaintiff could not establish that her employer violated the “without authorization” component of the statute. Ehling v. Monmouth-Ocean Hospital Service Corp. But the case puts employers on notice that they must tread carefully in this area.

U.S. Supreme Court Ruling in Windsor Striking Down DOMA Will Expand Workplace Protections for Employees in Legally Recognized Same-Sex Marriages

The U.S. Supreme Court issued a critical decision on June 26, 2013, striking down a provision of the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”) that limited the definition of marriage for federal purposes to unions of opposite-sex couples. The Court’s ruling in United States v. Windsor will have far-reaching implications for employers, at least in those states that recognize same-sex marriages, in terms of leave administration, benefits eligibility and workplace protections. In another case decided the same day, Hollingsworth v. Perry, the Court let stand a Federal District Court ruling in California that an amendment to the California Constitution limiting marriage to opposite sex couples was unconstitutional. In neither case did the Court require all states to recognize same-sex marriages.

The U.S. Supreme Court Decides Who is a “Supervisor” for Title VII Purposes

Yesterday, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Vance v. Ball State University, one of the most-anticipated decisions of the Court’s 2012 Term. The Vance case concerns who is considered a “supervisor” for purposes of establishing an employer’s liability for hostile work environment harassment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In a 5 to 4 decision, the Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, from which the case arose, and other lower courts which had defined “supervisor” to include only those individuals who possess the authority to fire, demote, promote, transfer, discipline or take some other tangible action against a harassment victim. The Court rejected the definition of “supervisor” proposed by the federal government, appearing as amicus curiae, and found in the EEOC’s Enforcement Guidelines, which links “supervisor” status to the ability to exercise direction over the victim’s daily work.

Supreme Court Reviews Employer Reimbursement Provisions in Employee Benefits Plans

In US Airways, Inc. v .McCutchen, decided on April 16, 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court once again emphasized that in disputes involving employee benefits plans governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1001, et seq. (“ERISA”), it is the unambiguous language of the plan in question that controls the rights of the parties and that general equitable principles cannot be used to supersede the terms of the plan. In areas where the plan is silent, however, courts may employ appropriate equitable principles to construe the plan. At issue in US Airways was the reimbursement provision of an employer’s health benefits plan that purported to give the employer the right to recoup medical benefits paid to an employee injured in an automobile accident who thereafter recovered funds from third parties as a result of the accident, although the amount the employee actually recovered after paying his attorney was less than the amount he owed his employer. The Supreme Court rejected the employee’s attempt to apply equitable principles of unjust enrichment to limit the application of the reimbursement provision. Holding, however, that the plan was silent as to the allocation of the costs, including attorneys fees, incurred by the employee in his efforts to recover from third parties, the Court further held the equitable principle known as “the common fund rule” should apply, entitling the employee to reasonable attorneys fees from the funds recovered. The decision makes clear the importance to employers of accomplishing the objectives of their benefits plans with clear-cut language.

The Supreme Court Addresses Offers of Judgment in the Context of Collective Actions

In Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symcyk, the U.S. Supreme Court, by a vote of 5 to 4, rejected an employee’s contention that her employer should not have been permitted to thwart her attempt to bring a collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) by making an offer of judgment to her under Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that included all of the relief to which she would have been entitled in connection with her individual FLSA claim. The Court’s April 16, 2013, ruling provides encouragement to employers who may seek to block an FLSA collective action with an offer of judgment–although, as detailed below, the Court’s opinion did leave one issue unresolved. The Court’s opinion also applies to cases brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) and the Equal Pay Act (“EPA”), as both of those statutes are governed by the collective action procedures of the FLSA rather than by the class action procedures of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.