Gibbons Law Alert

Gibbons Law Alert

Category: Pharmaceuticals

Edwards Lifesciences Corp. v. Meril Life Sciences Pvt. Ltd.: Should “Intent” Be Reconsidered in 271(e)(1)?

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Posted in Customs / ITC / Patent / Pharmaceuticals

On April 9, 2024

Edwards Lifesciences Corp. v. Meril Life Sciences Pvt. Ltd., Appeal No. 22-1877 (Fed. Cir. March 25, 2024) Considerations of 271(e)(1), a 2-1 decision on appeal from a grant of summary judgement of non-infringement, addressed the question of whether 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1)’s safe harbor applies to the importation of two medical devices (transcatheter heart valve systems) into the U.S. for purposes of exhibiting the devices at a prominent medical conference that reported on the latest developments in cardiovascular medicine.

Baxalta Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.: The Federal Circuit Addresses Enablement After Amgen v. Sanofi

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Posted in Biotech / Patent / Pharmaceuticals

On September 28, 2023

Baxalta Inc., v. Genentech, Inc., Appeal No. 2022-1461 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 20, 2023) is another in the line of cases where claims to biological compounds are drafted functionally and raise §112 issues. This decision was an appeal from a grant of summary judgment that held certain claims of Baxalta’s ‘590 patent invalid for lack of enablement. The technology involved antibodies for enhancing the mechanism for blood clotting to treat patients with hemophilia type A. Claim 1 of the patent recited “[a]n isolated antibody or antibody fragment thereof that binds Factor IX or Factor IXa and increases the procoagulant activity of Factor IXa.” (Emphasis added). The claim is drafted functionally; it describes what the antibody does, rather than what the antibody actually is, and it encompasses any antibody capable of achieving that function. The specification of the ‘590 patent disclosed only 11 actual antibodies that fell within the claim’s scope, and referred to generally known methods for producing and screening antibodies. Relying on the analysis provided by the Supreme Court’s recent decision, Amgen Inc. v. Sanofi, 598 U.S. 594 (2023), the court found that the ‘590 patent’s specification simply provided a roadmap for one to engage in the same iterative, trial-and-error process that the inventors used to find their 11 antibodies. It did not identify any common...

The District of Delaware Adopts the Federal Circuit’s Factors in Rejecting Regulatory Bar in a Protective Order

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Posted in Pharmaceuticals

On August 30, 2023

In Amicus Therapeutics US, LLC v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., United States Magistrate Judge Christopher J. Burke rejected the defendants-generic drug manufacturers’ demand that a so-called regulatory bar be included in the parties’ proposed protective order. In denying the request, Judge Burke adopted the Federal Circuit’s approach as set forth in cases like In re Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Ams., 605 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Despite denying the defendants’ request, and while noting the rarity of courts ordering the inclusion of similar provisions in protective orders, Judge Burke explicitly left the door open to the possibility, emphasizing the highly fact-sensitive nature of these disputes. The defendants sought the inclusion of a regulatory bar that would preclude anyone who was granted access to information marked “Confidential” or “Highly Confidential” under the proposed protective order from participating in any FDA proceedings concerning migalastat (the drug at issue in the case), including by filing a citizen petition. In deciding under what factors to analyze this discovery dispute, Judge Burke identified two possibilities: (a) the Third Circuit’s Pansy factors, or (b) the Federal Circuit’s Deutsche Bank factors. The court and the parties agreed the latter should be applied because the Third Circuit’s Pansy factors generally concern whether information should be protected from intentional disclosure from the public, whereas...

DNJ Court Grants Motion to Dismiss Based on Covenant Not to Sue

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Posted in Patent / Pharmaceuticals

On December 5, 2022

In Teva Branded Pharmaceutical Products R&D, Inc. v. Cipla Ltd., the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey recently granted the plaintiff, Teva Branded Pharmaceutical Products R&D, Inc.’s (“Teva”), motion to dismiss certain claims and counterclaims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on a covenant not to sue between Teva and defendant Cipla Ltd. (“Cipla”). The consolidated case is a Hatch-Waxman litigation involving several patents covering Teva’s Qvar® inhaler product. Originally, there were seven patents in dispute between the parties, but after Teva granted covenants not to sue for three of the patents to defendants Cipla and Aurobindo, the court entered stipulations and orders dismissing the parties’ claims and defenses as to those three patents. Thereafter, Teva provided defendants Cipla and Aurobindo each a covenant not to sue as to United States Patent No. 10,086,156 (“the ’156 patent”), another one of the original seven patents in dispute. Following the covenants not to sue, Teva and Aurobindo stipulated to the dismissal of the claims and counterclaims regarding the ’156 patent, but Teva and Cipla could not come to an agreement regarding the language for an order dismissing their respective claims and counterclaims. Consequently, Teva filed a motion to dismiss the claims and counterclaims relating to the ’156 patent. The court granted Teva’s...

Citing Need for Claim Construction, DNJ Court Denies Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on Pleadings

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Posted in Patent / Pharmaceuticals

On October 31, 2022

In Tolmar Therapeutics, Inc. v. Foresee Pharmaceuticals Co., Ltd., the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey recently denied the defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, reasoning that the motion could not be decided without claim construction. The plaintiff alleges that the defendant’s product CAMCEVI® infringes the plaintiff’s patent, which also covers the plaintiff’s Eligard® product. Both products are approved prostate cancer medications. Claim 1 of the patent-in-suit is directed to a controlled release composition that includes a polymer with an alkane diradical that comprises “about 4 to about 8 carbons.” The defendant moved for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) arguing (1) that the term “about 4 to about 8 carbons” in the patent-in-suit meant that the defendant’s use of 12 carbons (see, e.g., ECF No. 39 at 1) in its product could not literally infringe; and (2) that the plaintiff could not rely on the doctrine of equivalents, because the use of the term “about” in the claims limited the applicability of the doctrine of equivalents and because of the disclosure-dedication rule. In denying the defendant’s motion, United States District Judge Evelyn Padin reasoned that both the plaintiff’s literal infringement and doctrine of equivalents theories required the court to construe the term “about 4...

DNJ Court Denies Request for Early Summary Judgment Finding Motion Made Mid-Fact Discovery Premature

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Posted in Patent / Pharmaceuticals

On September 29, 2022

In Metacel Pharmaceuticals LLC v. Rubicon Research Private Limited, the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey recently denied the defendant’s request for leave to file a motion for summary judgment with respect to patent infringement. The plaintiff opposed the motion arguing that discovery was ongoing, and, in particular, the defendant had not yet produced certain samples necessary for the plaintiff to evaluate infringement. The plaintiff also argued there were also claim construction issues in the case that had not been resolved. The defendant’s motion was filed approximately two months before the parties’ opening claim construction briefs were due and, per the case’s scheduling order (ECF No. 25), fact discovery was to conclude 30 days after the court’s claim construction opinion. Agreeing with the plaintiff’s position, United States Magistrate Judge José R. Almonte found the defendant’s motion was “premature” and concluded that motions for summary judgment should be filed after claim construction. Gibbons will continue to monitor and report developments in Hatch-Waxman litigation in the District of New Jersey.

Northern District of California Relies on the Safe Harbor Defense of Section 271(e)(1) to Resolve Infringement Cases Early

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Posted in Biotech / Pharmaceuticals

On November 30, 2020

Two recent decisions from the Northern District of California show courts’ willingness to dispose of cases early in litigation through the safe harbor defense. The safe harbor of Section 271(e)(1) allows competitors, before the expiration of a patent, to engage in otherwise infringing activities if the use is “reasonably related to” obtaining regulatory approval. These two decisions provide pre-litigation and litigation guidance for life science companies that manufacture regulated products such as drugs and medical devices. The Supreme Court has construed the safe harbor to apply to drugs as well as medical devices and other products subject to Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval. Section 271(e)(1) of the Patent Act provides that: “It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell within the United States or import into the United States a patented invention … solely for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of information under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological products.” In Carl Zeiss Meditec v. Topcon Medical Systems, the N.D. Cal. granted with prejudice a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s patent infringement claim based on product testing as barred by the safe harbor of § 271(e)(1). Carl Zeiss alleged that software testing by Topcon...

Paragraph IV to Paragraph III Conversion Does Not Deprive a District Court of Subject Matter Jurisdiction in Hatch-Waxman Cases

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Posted in Patent / Pharmaceuticals

On July 7, 2020

In a significant Hatch-Waxman decision, a Delaware District Court recently denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), rejecting the argument that the conversion of the defendants’ Paragraph IV certifications to Paragraph III certifications deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction, but granted the defendants’ motion for partial judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). In H. Lundbeck A/S v. Apotex Inc., the defendants converted their Paragraph IV certifications for certain patents at issue to Paragraph III certifications. Under 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(viii), an ANDA filer must make any one of four (I-IV) certifications for each Orange Book listed patent. A Paragraph IV certification is an ANDA filer’s statement that it intends to market its bioequivalent pharmaceutical product before the expiration of a patent listed as covering that product because the ANDA filer believes such patent is either not infringed or invalid. A Paragraph III certification is an ANDA filer’s statement that it will not market its bioequivalent product until after the expiration of a patent listed as covering that product. The Court reasoned that in a Hatch-Waxman action, subject matter jurisdiction exists when a patent owner alleges that the filing of an ANDA infringes its patent under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) and conversion from a...

“Good Cause” Not Required for Contention Amendments in the District of Delaware

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Posted in Patent / Pharmaceuticals

On June 29, 2020

In Bio Delivery Sciences International Incorporated v. Alvogen PB Research & Development LLC, a Delaware District Court recently denied the plaintiffs’ motion to strike two prior art references from the defendants’ supplemental invalidity contentions, reasoning that the defendants were not obligated, as the plaintiffs argued, to demonstrate good cause for the amendment. The court noted that the case’s scheduling order did not contain a “good cause” requirement for amending contentions or a requirement that contentions be amended before the date on which the defendants served their amended contentions. The court reasoned that, while the amended contentions did need to comport with the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 26, an analysis under the Pennypack factors did not require striking the references. In particular, the “possibility of curing the prejudice” and “likelihood of disruption of trial” factors militated strongly in the defendants’ favor because the plaintiffs did not need further discovery on the references and could address them easily in their expert reports, which would not have any impact on the trial date. Interestingly, had these defendants been litigating in the District of New Jersey they would have been obligated to demonstrate “good cause,” where Local Patent Rule 3.7 requires a showing of “good cause” for any party to amend “contentions, disclosures, or other documents required...

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