Gibbons Law Alert

Gibbons Law Alert

Gibbons Law Alert

Category: Appellate

Redacted Use of Force Report in Which the Subject of the Force Is a Minor Must Be Disclosed, Appellate Division Holds

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Posted in Appellate

On March 27, 2020

A recent Appellate Division decision provides for increased transparency into the activities of law enforcement, ruling that a use of force report (“UFR”) involving a minor should not have been withheld under New Jersey’s Open Public Records Act of 2001 (“OPRA”). A UFR is a one-page report required by a New Jersey Attorney General directive to be filed in all circumstances in which law enforcement personnel use physical, mechanical, or deadly force against a civilian. In January 2018, a Trentonian reporter received a tip that Ewing Township law enforcement used excessive force against a minor. The reporter filed a public records request for any UFRs generated as a result of the encounter. Ewing denied the request, citing OPRA, which provides that “records of law enforcement agencies, pertaining to juveniles charged as delinquent or found to be part of a juvenile-family crisis, shall be strictly safeguarded from public inspection.” The Trentonian sued Ewing and its municipal clerk for release of the UFR, arguing that the UFR should be released in redacted form, removing the identifying information about the minor but leaving the information about the police officer’s use of force. The trial court upheld Ewing’s denial of access, finding that the UFR was a juvenile record protected from disclosure under OPRA. The Trentonian appealed, joined by...

FOI-led: Supreme Court Restricts Public Access to Confidential Business Information

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Posted in Appellate / General Litigation

On July 11, 2019

In Food Marketing Institute v. Argus Leader Media, the United States Supreme Court expanded the meaning of “confidential” information exempt from disclosure under Exemption 4 of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). In doing so, the Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit and definitively rejected the “competitive harm” requirement adopted by the D.C. Circuit in National Parks & Conservation Assn. v. Morton. Respondent Argus Leader Media filed a FOIA request with the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), seeking the names and addresses of all retail stores that participate in a federal food stamp program known as SNAP. Argus Leader also sought each store’s annual redemption data from 2005 to 2010. The USDA declined to disclose store-level SNAP data based on Exemption 4 of FOIA, which precludes disclosure of “trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential.” Argus Leader sued the USDA. The district court ordered disclosure based upon the failure to satisfy the “competitive harm” test, which requires a party to establish confidentiality by proving that disclosure is “likely … to cause substantial harm to [its] competitive position.” The Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgment. In a 6-3 decision delivered by Justice Gorsuch, the Court rejected the competitive harm test and...

11th Circuit’s Stay Suggests that the FTC’s Final Order Against LabMD May Itself be “Unfair” and “Unreasonable”

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Posted in Appellate / General Litigation

On November 16, 2016

As reported on this blog on September 27, 2016, the FTC issued a Final Order holding that LabMD’s data security practices were “unreasonable” and constituted an “unfair” business practice in violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTC Act”), 15 U.S.C. §45(a) and (n). The findings were a clear signal of the FTC’s expanding efforts to regulate data security and to incentivize companies handling sensitive data to implement and maintain strong data security practices. On Thursday, November 10, 2016, the 11th Circuit stayed enforcement of the FTC’s Final Order pending a full hearing and final decision on LabMD’s appeal, and called into question the validity of the FTC’s conclusions as to what may constitute an actionable “privacy harm” following a data security breach.

Third Circuit Finds Waiver of Right to Arbitrate After Ten Months of Litigation

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Posted in Appellate

On February 7, 2013

In its recent opinion in In re: Pharmacy Benefit Managers Antitrust Litigation, the Third Circuit held that a defendant waived its right to arbitration after “actively” and “aggressively” litigating an antitrust dispute for ten months, even though no discovery had taken place. Emphasizing that no one factor is determinative, the Third Circuit’s holding is somewhat of a departure from prior cases finding waiver, which “uniformly featured significant discovery activity in the District Court.”

Second Circuit Clarifies the Pleading Standard for “Substantial Assistance” in SEC Enforcement Cases Against Aiders and Abettors

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Posted in Appellate / Securities

On November 21, 2012

In SEC v. Apuzzo, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals recently lowered the pleading standard for aiding and abetting of securities fraud in SEC enforcement actions by reversing the District Court’s finding that proximate causation of the ultimate harm was required to establish substantial assistance. When evaluating aiding and abetting claims, courts previously extended the proximate cause requirement that applies in litigation between private parties to SEC enforcement proceedings. The SEC’s complaint in Apuzzo outlined the details of a complex, but calculated, fraud scheme. The defendant-appellee, Joseph Apuzzo, was the CFO of an equipment manufacturer — Terex Corporation.

Second Circuit Holds That a Post-Disclosure Stock Price Rebound Does Not Per Se Preclude Damages for Alleged Federal Securities Fraud

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Posted in Appellate / Securities

On September 6, 2012

Recently, the Second Circuit vacated a District Court’s dismissal of a securities fraud action brought by Acticon AG, shareholder of China North East Petroleum Holdings Ltd. (“NEP”), for failure to plead economic loss—a necessary element to maintain a private damages action under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“§10(b)”). Acticon had multiple opportunities to, but did not, sell its NEP shares at a profit after NEP’s disclosure of the alleged fraud. The Court held that economic loss is not conclusively negated at the pleadings stage where the price of a security recovers shortly after a disclosure of alleged fraud. Significantly, in drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff under NEP’s 12(b)(6) motion, the Court explained that a rise in the price of a stock following a corrective disclosure requires an inquiry into whether the security rose for “reasons unrelated to [the] initial drop,” and thus introduces factual questions and competing theories of causation that would be inappropriate to resolve on a motion to dismiss.

New Amendments to New Jersey Court Rules Will Make Orders Denying Arbitration Immediately Appealable

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Posted in Appellate

On August 13, 2012

The amended Rules Governing the Courts of the State of New Jersey will take effect on September 4, 2012. Among the more important amendments are those concerning a party’s ability to appeal an arbitration order. Typically, only final orders that conclude a litigation as to all parties and all issues are immediately appealable. But, as a result of amendments made in 2010, the current version of Rule 2:2-3(a) expands the notion of a final order in the context of orders compelling arbitration, providing that “an order compelling arbitration, whether the action is dismissed or stayed, shall also be deemed a final judgment of the Court for appeal purposes.” The New Jersey Supreme Court in GMAC v. Pittella, 205 N.J. 572 (2011), expanded that Rule still further by holding that “orders compelling or denying arbitration are deemed final and appealable as of right as of the date entered.” To implement that decision, Rule 2:2-3(a) has been amended to state that “any order either compelling arbitration, whether the action is dismissed or stayed, or denying arbitration shall also be deemed a final judgment of the Court for appeal purposes.” An amendment to Rule 2:9-1(a) will permit the Trial Court to retain jurisdiction, pending appeal, over other parties and claims that remain in that court.

Third Circuit Sets High Bar for Proof of Price-Fixing, Affirms Dismissal on Summary Judgment Based on Twombly

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Posted in Antitrust / Appellate

On August 6, 2012

The Third Circuit’s July 27, 2012, opinion in Superior Offshore International, Inc. v. Bristow Group, Inc., confirms that an antitrust plaintiff relying on circumstantial evidence of price-fixing must demonstrate something more than merely parallel behavior, not only to survive a motion to dismiss, as the Supreme Court held in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, but also to defeat summary judgment. Thus, unless a plaintiff can present record evidence that is plausibly suggestive of, and not just consistent with, an illegal agreement to fix prices, a defendant moving for summary judgment should prevail. Indeed, without evidence of a manifest agreement not to compete, Superior Offshore International (“SOI”) suggests that courts will not infer an illegal price-fixing arrangement even where participants in an oligopoly market raise prices despite a weakening of demand for their services.

Second Circuit Finds No Anti-Competitive Conduct in Eatoni v. RIM, Applies “Manifest Disregard of the Law,” Post-Hall Street

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Posted in Antitrust / Appellate

On June 28, 2012

In a summary order issued on June 21, 2012, the Second Circuit in Eatoni Ergonomics, Inc. v. Research in Motion Corp., affirmed the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of Eatoni’s monopolization complaint against BlackBerry maker RIM for failure adequately to plead anti-competitive conduct. Significantly, the Court held that individual instances of alleged misconduct that are not anti-competitive on their own do not state a claim under Section 2 of the Sherman Act when considered together.

Plaintiff Limited to Nominal Presumed Damages in Defamation Case Absent Proof of Actual Harm

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Posted in Appellate

On June 12, 2012

On May 21, 2012, the New Jersey Supreme Court issued a corrected Opinion in W.J.A. v. D.A.. In that Opinion, the Court held that presumed damages continue to play a role in New Jersey’s defamation jurisprudence in private plaintiff cases that do not involve matters of public concern. Where a plaintiff does not proffer any evidence of actual damage to reputation, the doctrine of presumed damages permits him/her to survive a motion for summary judgment and to obtain nominal damages if successful at trial. The Court emphasized, however, that in order to receive compensatory damages, a plaintiff must prove actual harm to his/her reputation.

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