Gibbons Law Alert
Over thirty years ago, the USPTO awarded the first gene patent (US 4,447,538) and the Supreme Court held that biological inventions were subject to patent protection. Since then, tens of thousands of U.S. “gene” or DNA related patents have issued. However, there has been much uncertainty over the patentability of such inventions as of late.
In Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Rackspace Hosting, Inc., Eastern District of Texas Chief District Judge Leonard Davis granted Rackspace’s motion to dismiss Uniloc’s complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to allege infringement of a patentable claim under 35 U.S.C. § 101. This ruling is notable for several reasons: the Court granted an early motion to dismiss for the defendant in a historically pro-patentee jurisdiction (E.D. Texas), and the early dismissal resulted from the court finding the patent invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Discovery of computer source code–either through production, inspection, or deposition–is one of the more contentious aspects of patent litigation. Indeed, “few tasks excite a defendant less . . . . Engineers and management howl at the notion of providing strangers, and especially a fierce competitor, access to the crown jewels. Counsel struggle to understand even exactly what code exists and exactly how it can be made available for reasonable inspection. All sorts of questions are immediately posed. . . . Put simply, source code production is disruptive, expensive, and fraught with monumental opportunities to screw up.” Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 11-1846, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62971, *10-11 (N.D. Cal. May 4, 2012) (ECF No. 898).
We previously reported on a sua sponte Memorandum Order where Senior U.S. District Court Judge Milton I. Shadur of the Northern District of Illinois took counsel to task for the quality of its answer and counterclaim. In New Paradigm Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a Q101 v. Merlin Media LLC, No. 12 C 5160, Slip Op. (N.D. Ill. Oct. 12, 2012), Judge Shadur again took issue with the pleadings. This time, the Court sua sponte found New Paradigm’s responses to Merlin Media’s answers, counterclaims and affirmative defenses to be “problematic.”
Two cases decided last month highlight the somewhat disparate pleading standards in patent infringement actions among districts after Twombly and Iqbal. In The Nielsen Co. v. comScore, Inc., a plaintiff in the Eastern District of Virginia overcame a motion to dismiss infringement claims. Case No. 11-cv-168 (E.D.Va. Aug. 19, 2011) (Davis, J.). The court held that the claims for direct infringement met the lenient pleading standard of Form 18 provided under the Federal Rules. While in Medsquire LLC v. Spring Med. Sys. Inc., the district court for the Central District of California granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss. 2-11-cv-04504 (C.D. Cal. August 31, 2011) (Nguyen, J.). The court held the plaintiff’s Form 18 pleading resulted in conclusory statements that failed to include any facts identifying the relevant aspect of the [accused product] that infringed the patents and the complaint was insufficient to meet the “plausibility” standard set forth in Twombly and Iqbal.
On February 9, 2011, the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (USPTO) issued Supplementary Examination Guidelines for Determining Compliance With 35 U.S.C. § 112 and for Treatment of Related Issues in Patent Applications (the “Guidelines”). The Guidelines have immediate effect, but the USPTO will consider written comments received by April 11, 2011. Part 1 of the Guidelines pertains to the provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 112, 2 regarding claim definiteness, while Part 2 of the Guidelines pertains to the examination of so-called “computer-implemented functional claim limitations.”
New York now has the highest number of confirmed COVID-19 cases in the United States, and, unfortunately, the number continues to increase on a daily basis. In efforts to contain the spread of the virus and support those employees who have been impacted, Governor Cuomo and the legislature have acted swiftly to enact responsive laws. Relief for Employees on Orders of Quarantine or Isolation On March 18, 2020, Governor Cuomo signed into law Senate Bill S809/ Assembly Bill A10153, which provides job protection and paid leave for New York employees subject to mandatory or precautionary orders of quarantine or isolation issued by the State of New York, the Department of Health, local board of health, or any governmental entity duly authorized to issue such orders due to COVID-19. The law is effective immediately and provides sick leave to affected employees as follows: Employers with ten or fewer employees as of January 1, 2020 and a net income less than $1 million must provide affected employees with unpaid sick leave, along with job protection for the duration of the quarantine or isolation order and must provide those employees with access to Paid Family Leave and disability benefits (short-term disability) for the period of quarantine or isolation including wage replacement for their salaries up to $150,000. Employers...
In Mission Product Holdings v. Tempnology, the Supreme Court, in an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice Kagan, held that a debtor’s rejection of a trademark license under Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code does not terminate the licensee’s rights to use the trademark under the agreement. Tempnology made clothing and accessories designed to stay cool during exercise, and marketed those products under the brand name “Coolcore.” In 2012, Tempnology gave Mission Product Holdings an exclusive license to distribute certain Coolcore products in the United States and granted Mission a non-exclusive global license to use the Coolcore trademarks. The agreement was set to expire in July 2016. In September 2015, however, Tempnology filed for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, and rejected the license agreement under Section 365(a). The Bankruptcy Court held that Tempnology’s rejection of the agreement revoked Mission’s right to use the marks. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel reversed. The First Circuit rejected the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel’s view and reinstated the Bankruptcy Court’s decision. The First Circuit reasoned that Congress, in enacting Section 365(n) in 1988, “expressly listed six kinds of intellectual property,” but not trademarks. The First Circuit thus held that trademark licenses are categorically unprotected from court-approved rejection. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and reversed the First Circuit. Section 365(a) of...
Abstract ideas are not patentable pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 101. And, in Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014) the Supreme Court set forth a framework to determine whether a patent is directed to an unpatentable abstract idea. Following Alice, defendants frequently move to dismiss patent infringement actions based on Section 101. That is exactly what recently happened in Cellspin Soft, Inc., v. Fitbit, Inc. in the Northern District of California. In that case, the 14 defendants filed a joint motion to dismiss pursuant to Section 101, arguing that the patents were directed to the “abstract concept” of acquiring, transferring, and publishing data and that the claims recited only “generic computer technology” to carry out the abstract idea, and thus lacked a requisite “transformative step” which would render the abstract idea patentable. The District Court agreed and entered judgment in the defendants’ favor. Following their successful motion to dismiss, the defendants moved, again successfully, for attorneys’ fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285. In patent infringement actions, courts have discretion, pursuant to Section 285, to award attorneys’ fees in an “exceptional case.” And, the district court found that the Cellspin case was just that. In considering the defendants’ motion for fees, the district court acknowledged that the plaintiff’s claims lacked...
The Supreme Court in WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp. opened a new door to recover for patent damages in its holding that a patent owner can recover damages for patent infringement under 35 U.S.C. §271(f)(2) and §284 of lost foreign profits. The Patent Act outlines several ways an alleged infringer may be liable for patent infringement, including §271(f) which “expands the definition of infringement to include supplying from the United States a patented invention’s components.” 35 U.S.C. §284 authorizes “damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer.” In this case, WesternGeco developed technology for surveying the ocean floor for oil and gas companies. ION Geophysical Corp. sold a competing system where the components were manufactured in the United States and shipped abroad. The Southern District of Texas found that ION Geophysical Corporation infringed WesternGeco’s patents, and that WesternGeco lost specific contracts due to ION’s infringement. The district court awarded $93.4 million in lost profits and $12.5 million in royalties. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the award of lost-profit damages following its precedent in Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int’l, Inc., 711 F. 3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2013) which held that...