Tagged: Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)
The time warehouse workers spent waiting to undergo and undergoing antitheft security screenings before leaving work is not compensable under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et. seq., as amended by the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, §251 et. seq. (Portal-to-Portal Act), according to the United States Supreme Court, which unanimously decided Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Busk on December 9, 2014.
Effective January 1, 2015, the Fair Labor Standards Act overtime exemption for “domestic service workers” will change, having significant ramifications for employers of these employees. Until this change, domestic service workers generally have been exempt from overtime compensation, which means they need not be paid at the rate of time and a half for hours worked in excess of 40 per workweek. The U.S. Department of Labor has issued a Fact Sheet to summarize the changes.
On March 21, 2014, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit joined a growing number of federal Courts of Appeals to reject arguments that class waivers contained in arbitration agreements should not be enforced in the employment context. In Walthour v. Chipio Windshield Repair LLC, the Eleventh Circuit (which covers Georgia, Florida, and Alabama) upheld a broad arbitration provision which required employees to bring all employment claims in their “individual capacity and not as a plaintiff of class member in a purported class or representative proceeding ….”
On January 27, 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a unanimous opinion in Sandifer v. United States Steel Corp., which clarified what it means for an employee to be “changing clothes” under Section 3(o) of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”). The Court’s decision will affect unionized workplaces, where employees change in and out of (or “don and doff”) protective or sanitary clothing in connection with their jobs.
The question concerning the enforceability of class action waivers in arbitration agreements to foreclose an employee’s ability to litigate collective actions under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) has been answered affirmatively in New York by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. On October 15, 2013, the Second Circuit rejected a rehearing petition from Stephanie Sutherland, a former Ernst & Young LLP employee, who challenged a class action wavier in an arbitration agreement that barred her from pursuing a collective action for overtime pay under the FLSA. The decision lets stand the Circuit Court’s August 9th panel ruling that an employee can be required as a condition of employment to waive, pursuant to an arbitration agreement, the right to bring a collective or class action.
A recent Third Circuit decision, In re Enterprise Rent-A-Car Wage & Hour Employment Practices Litigation, addresses the circumstances under which a parent company will be liable under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) as a “joint employer” of employees of the parent’s subsidiaries. The Third Circuit’s opinion gives concrete guidance to employers confronted by the broad definition of “employer” set forth in the FLSA’s regulations, providing a standard for assessing joint employer liability. (The FLSA defines an employer as “any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee.”) Although the standard announced by the Third Circuit is by no means a bright-line test, it does provide fair notice to employers of the factors that will determine joint employer status.
In a major victory for pharmaceutical companies, the U.S. Supreme Court recently held that company sales representatives who promote their employer’s products to doctors and hospitals are exempt from the overtime requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”). In doing so, the Court resolved a split in the Circuit Courts of Appeal over the scope of the “outside salesman” exemption to the FLSA’s overtime pay requirements. The Court’s holding in Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp. regarding the scope of this exemption has provided much needed clarity to pharmaceutical companies and employers with similar types of sales forces who have relied – and hope to continue to rely – on the exemption.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has held that two pharmaceutical companies did not violate the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) by failing to pay overtime to their sales representatives, concluding that the FLSA’s “administrative exemption” from the statute’s overtime requirements was applicable to these employees. Although the Court’s opinion focused on the job duties of pharmaceutical sales representatives (PSRs), the Court’s analysis of the general scope of the administrative exemption may prove useful to employers in other industries.
On March 27, 2012, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit issued a precedential decision in Knepper v. Rite Aid Corp. which dramatically alters the landscape for wage and hour litigation for employers operating in the jurisdictions within the Third Circuit, i.e., in New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Specifically, the Third Circuit ruled that the procedures for litigating a class action alleging state wage and hour violations is not “inherently incompatible” with the procedures for litigating a collective action under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”). As a result, courts in these jurisdictions may well see a wave of hybrid class/collective actions alleging wage and hour violations under both the FLSA and the corresponding state wage and hour laws in the same complaint.
The issue of whether a hospital system (operating over 25 facilities) and its Chief Executive Officer can be held liable for wage claims by workers employed at a single entity within the system was decided by the Eastern District of New York in Wolman v. Catholic Health System of Long Island, Inc. Applying traditional tests to assess “joint employer” liability, the District Court concluded that plaintiffs did not plead the basic elements in the complaint to hold the hospital system and its CEO liable for alleged unpaid wages. The Court reached a similar conclusion regarding several underlying claims — failure to compensate employees for meal periods and for time spent pre- and post-shift — based on plaintiffs’ inadequate pleadings.
