Since the Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, it has been clear that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) has the authority under the Clean Air Act (“CAA”) to regulate emissions of greenhouse gases (“GHGs”) from mobile sources because GHGs fall within the CAA’s definition of an “air pollutant.” When EPA sought to regulate GHG emissions from stationary sources (mainly power plants and factories), however, the Court sang a slightly different tune. In Utility Air Regulatory Group v. Environmental Protection Agency (“UARG”), the Court rejected EPA’s attempt to regulate GHG emissions from stationary sources under two regulatory programs based solely on those emissions, while affirming the agency’s ability to regulate such emissions from so-called “anyway” sources that are already undergoing regulatory review because of emissions of other pollutants.
Author: John H. Klock
On April 29, 2014, in EPA, et al v. EME Homer City Generation, LP, the United States Supreme Court ruled in favor of the US Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) and its controversial “Transport Rule” which curbed nitrous oxide and sulfur dioxide emissions in 27 upwind states. The Supreme Court held it was appropriate to defer to EPA’s expertise in crafting a method of implementing the Clean Air Act’s (“CAA”) “Good Neighbor” provision to reduce pollution from upwind states onto their downwind neighbors.
In 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court created great confusion in Rapanos v. United States over what wetlands fell within the coverage of the Clean Water Act (CWA) by setting out two separate tests for jurisdiction, one in the four-justice plurality opinion led by Justice Scalia, and one in a separate concurrence by Justice Kennedy. In an attempt to resolve the confusion, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Army Corps of Engineers jointly released a draft rule. The rule is intended to clarify what streams and wetlands are covered by the Clean Water Act.
The Deposition Not Taken: Eighth Circuit Holds Third Party Document to be Business Records of Another Entity Admissible Under FRE 803(6)
In Residential Funding Co., LLC v. Terrace Mortgage Co., (Docket No. 12-2569, August 7, 2013) the Eighth Circuit upheld a grant of summary judgment, including damages evidenced by records created by a third party and supported by the third party’s affidavit. Ordinarily, an affidavit of a third party, if authenticated under FRE 902(11) (See Klock, New Jersey Practice, V2D, 555 (West 2009) is admissible if an appropriate foundation is laid. See Klock, New Jersey Practice, V2E, 342-43 (West 2012). Proper authentication requires notice of intent to use the affidavit. The affidavit in question apparently was not authenticated in that manner.
“Removal vs. Remedial Action? – That is the Question” Second Circuit Answers “Removal” and Vacates District Court’s Grant of Dismissal on CERCLA Statute of Limitations Grounds in State of New York v. Next Millenium Realty, LLC
Environmental attorneys have long wrestled with the issue of whether particular clean-up activities under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) fall under the statute of limitations for remedial actions, considered to be permanent responsive action, or for removals, considered to be interim remedial measures to address immediate threats to public health. In a governmental cost recovery action, guessing wrong can deprive a federal or state governmental entity of its ability to recover its clean up costs from Potentially Responsible Parties. In State of New York v. Next Millenium Realty, LLC, the Second Circuit vacated the District Court’s determination, holding that once an activity is instituted as a removal, it remains a removal until completion, even if it is incorporated into the final permanent remedy.
When government actions cause flooding of your land, does it constitute a “taking” that triggers the Fifth Amendment’s requirement of “just compensation?” Supreme Court precedent dating back to 1872 teaches that when the flooding is permanent, such as when a new dam creates a lake, a compensable taking has occurred. But what if the flooding is only temporary? Can that constitute a taking? The Federal Circuit said, “Never.” In Arkansas Game and Fish Commission v. United States, the Supreme Court disagreed, and said, “Sometimes.”
Texas Federal Court Splits Environmental Claims: CERCLA Claims Remain in Federal Court, State Claims are Remanded to State Court
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas in May v. Apache Corporation, 2012 WL 156547 (S.D.Tex. May 1, 2012) issued an interesting decision on the relationship between federal and state environmental claims and where they can be heard. The case has some parallels to a case pending in the New Jersey State court captioned the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection v. Occidental Chemical Corp., et als.
An 1881 deed and an 1882 Supreme Court decision formed the background for a very modern controversy recently addressed by the Pennsylvania Superior Court. The decision, Butler v. Estate of Powers, casts a shadow over ownership rights in natural gas contained in the Marcellus Shale formation, and has left many companies in the “fracking” industry uncertain about what they own.
Either/Or: Third Circuit Reads Rapanos as Establishing Two Alternative Tests for Federal Regulatory Jurisdiction Over Wetlands
The Clean Water Act regulates the placement of fill into the “waters of the United States.” That term has come to include wetlands — or at least some wetlands. The Supreme Court’s last attempt, in Rapanos v. United States, to clarify which wetlands fall within the statute’s coverage caused great confusion, as the five Justices who agreed on the judgment (a four-Justice plurality led by Justice Scalia, and Justice Kennedy, who concurred separately) generated two separate tests for jurisdiction. Which test should lower courts apply? In an opinion released on October 31, the Third Circuit said, “both” — if the wetlands in question satisfy either Justice Scalia’s test or Justice Kennedy’s test, they fall within the statute’s reach.
If the Creek Don’t Rise — Montana’s Right to Rental for Riverbeds Used by Power Company’s Dams Now Before the U.S. Supreme Court – PPL Montana, LLC v. State of Montana
The U.S. Supreme Court will take up another Montana river case. The case involves a dispute between the State of Montana and a power company that purchased dams on several Montana rivers, which are licensed under the Federal Power Act by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. The last time Montana visited the U.S. Supreme Court, it lost to Wyoming in a dispute over water usage under the Yellowstone River Compact. This time Montana stands to gain $41,000,000 as fair market rental for its river beds granted on summary judgment and upheld by the Montana Supreme Court.