Last year’s Supreme Court’s decision in B&B Hardware raised the stakes in opposition proceedings when it stated that TTAB rulings may have preclusive effects in subsequent federal district court litigation. As litigants and practitioners are still assessing the consequences of that landmark decision, an unexpected confrontation took place between the Board and the Federal District.
Tagged: Lanham Act
A federal district court in the Northern District of California has recently given litigants in trademark counterfeiting cases guidance on where wrongful seizure claims under the ex parte provisions of the Lanham Act may be brought. The court ruled in United Tactical Systems, LLC v. Real Action Paintball, Inc. that wrongful seizure claims may be brought in any federal court, and not just the court that ordered the seizure. The case should be watched by accused infringers who have been the target of an ex parte seizure under the Lanham Act.
Illinois Court Refuses to Release Frozen Funds or Enlarge Bond Amount in Trademark Counterfeiting Case
A federal district court in the Northern District of Illinois has refused a request by certain defendants accused of trademark counterfeiting to release funds frozen in PayPal accounts and to increase the amount of a bond posted by the plaintiff in the case. The case highlights an uptick in challenges to financial asset restraints by defendants and nonparties in trademark counterfeiting cases and the discretion courts have in setting an appropriate bond to protect defendants in such cases.
Judge Preska of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York recently awarded attorneys’ fees, damages, and prejudgment interest on damages, but not fees to defendants, in a trademark counterfeiting case. In Prince of Peace Enterprises, Inc. v. Top Quality Food Market, LLC, Judge Preska adopted in part a report and recommendation of Magistrate Judge Maas, ending an eight-year litigation surrounding ex parte seizures of herbal supplements which took place in 2007.
On September 17, 2014, the Second Circuit issued its long awaited decision in Gucci America, Inc. et. al. v. Li et. al., 2014 WL 4629049 (Appeal Nos. 11-3934 & 12-4557). In its decision, the Court vacated and remanded an August 2011 order compelling nonparty Bank of China (BOC) to comply with a document subpoena and asset freeze provision in an injunction and a May 2012 order denying the bank’s motion to reconsider. The court also reversed a November 2012 decision holding the bank in contempt for non-compliance with the court’s August 2011 order and imposing civil penalties.
A Contested Order By The Federal Circuit Denies Request For En Banc Review Of Its Decision That Patent Co-Owners May Not Be Involuntarily Joined In A Patent Dispute
Recently, the Federal Circuit issued an order denying a request for en banc review of a panel decision that held that a patent co-owner may not be involuntarily joined as a plaintiff in a patent dispute. It is generally recognized that all owners to a patent in suit must be a party to the action, otherwise the suit is dismissed for lack of standing. The reason is that a defendant should not be subjected to multiple suits by different parties regarding the same patent. The Federal Circuit in STC.UNM v. Intel Corporation considered the situation in which Sandia Corp (a co-owner of the patent in suit) refused to join STC.UNM’s (the licensing arm of the University of New Mexico) patent infringement suit against Intel.
Blurred Lines: Third Circuit’s Lanham Act Attorneys’ Fees Analysis Follows Recent Supreme Court Ruling in Patent Case
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently decided that the U.S. Supreme Court’s April decision on attorneys’ fees in a patent case, Octane Fitness, LLC v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., should also be applied in trademark cases under the Lanham Act. See Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, Nos. 13-3305 & 14-1572 (3d Cir. Sept. 4, 2014). Defendant Dempster had successfully moved to dismiss the action under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and was awarded its attorneys’ fees under § 35(a) of the Lanham Act and the Virgin Islands Code. Plaintiff Fair Wind Sailing appealed the fee award. The Third Circuit ultimately vacated the District Court’s fee award and remanded, instructing the court below to utilize an inquiry consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Octane Fitness.
On August 14, 2014, Pro-Football, Inc. (“Pro-Football”) appealed the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board’s (“TTAB”) June 18, 2014 decision to cancel its registrations for six REDSKIN-formative trademarks. As we previously reported, the TTAB’s 2-1 decision found that those trademarks were not entitled to be registered on the basis that a “substantial composite of Native Americans found the term REDSKINS to be disparaging in connection with [the football team’s] services” during the time period when registration was sought.
Judge Koeltl of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York recently adopted a recommended statutory damages award of $6.6 million dollars in a case involving trademark counterfeiting. Richemont Int’l S.A. et. al. v. Montesol Ou, et. al., 2014 WL 3732919, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 28, 2014). The plaintiff sellers of luxury goods had initially sought $78 million or $2 million per counterfeit mark per type of good counterfeited in connection with 88 domain names operated by the defendants. Richemont Int’l S.A. et. al. v. Montesol Ou, et. al., 2014 WL 3732887, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 13, 2014). But Magistrate Judge Pitman recommended instead an award of $6.6 million, including $6.3 million under the Trademark Act and $300,000 under the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act.
On July 14, 2014, the United States Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) found the trademark “BioMcDiesel” for biodiesel fuel likely to cause confusion with McDonald’s Corporation’s (“McDonald’s”) famous family of MC-formative trademarks. McDonald’s Corporation v. Joel D. Joseph, Opposition No. 91194117 (July 14, 2014) [not precedential]. The applicant, Joel Joseph, appeared pro se to defend his application, which was based on intent to use. McDonald’s challenged the application on three bases under the Lanham Act, namely, likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d), dilution under Sections 13 and 43(c), and on the basis that Mr. Joseph filed the application in bad faith, in that he lacked a bona fide intent to use the mark and solely filed the application for the purpose of selling or licensing the mark to McDonald’s. The TTAB’s decision addressed only the likelihood of confusion claim, and found the “BioMcDiesel” mark was not entitled to registration.